Ruggie, John Gerard. (1982). "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order". International Organization, 36(2), 379-415. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198221%2936%3A2%3C379%3AIRTACE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23
International regimes are defined by Ruggie to be, “social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (380). He then implores that we think about them as, “the language of state action” (380). This language is constructed by a “generative grammar” (380), which consists of “principles, norms, rules and procedures (380).
In this piece, Ruggie is interested in exploring the nature of a liberal economic order as it progressed after WWII. Specifically, he takes a bit of terminology from Polanyi and talks about “Embedded Liberalism”. Polanyi used the word embedded to refer to the relationship between the economy and society. Before the “three fictitious commodities” were commodified, the economy was embedded in society. When the economy was dis-embedded from society, that is what caused the great turmoil that eventually lead to the rise of fascism and the horrible events of WWII. Ruggie, along a similar vein, wants to make the eventual claim that a liberal economic order was embedded within society.
Claims that, when a great hegemon arises, a liberal economic order is sure to follow are shallow for Ruggie. This does not help us understand economic regimes. Instead, we must look elsewhere and Ruggie looks in three places: He looks at the generative grammer, or structure, of international regimes. These, he claims, can provide insight on the form but not the content of the regime. This leads to his argument about embedded liberalism. Secondly, Ruggie examines the relationship between international economic regimes and developments in the international economy. These developments do not move evenly, or in tandem. However, there are several specific developments that emerge which I will not detail here. He thirdly argues that power and purpose do not necessarily work in conjunction, and that change in international regimes does not always directly follow the wishes of the hegemon.
He then provides evidence for these hypotheses and conclusions. I will not examine that in detail, though the article is an engaging read.
