Polillo and Guillén: Globalization Pressures and the State

Polillo, Simone, & Guillén, Mauro. (2005). "Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence". American Journal of Sociology, 110(6), 1764-1802. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/428685

“We agree that globalization has shifted power around the state. The existing literature, however, has not empirically explored the mechanisms that account for such a shift…The goal of this article is to analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of globalization on specific state structures, controlling for domestic macroeconomic and political characteristics” (1766). Specifically, this article examines central bank independence and its role as a response to the effects of globalization.

This article then goes on to examine the role of the central bank, and why CBI is an increasingly important phenomena. “…we focus our theoretical analysis on the impact of global institutional forces on central bank independence. We examine two types of effects: 1.) international coercive pressures that affect countries, including their dependency on foreign trade, investment and multilateral lending; and 2.) cross-national international influences that operate through the network of bilateral trade ties in the form of cohesion and role equivalence effects” (1773).

Three hypotheses are then put forth: “the greater the exposure to foreign trade, foreign investment or multilateral lending, the more independent the central bank” (1776). “The more a given country trades with other countries with an independent central bank, the more independent its own central bank because of normative pressure” (1778). “The more a country competes in trade against third countries with an independent central bank, the more independent its own central bank” (1780)

They then deploy a quantitative method to try to answer these three hypotheses. The dependent variable is a measure of CBI. The independent variables are many. I fear they suffer from a problem of multicolliniarity.

“Our results indicate that international coercive, normative and mimetic pressures explain the adoption of central bank independence, lending support for each of our hypotheses” (1788).

“The purpose of this article was to examine the impact of globalization on the state, using the specific case of the central bank and its independence from the executive branch as the empirical setting…We argued that, be cause of cross-national economic, political, and cultural competition in a context of globalization, the state is subject to coercive, normative and mimetic pressures. In response to these pressures, the state reorganizes itself, with a strong tendency toward emulating the organizational forms and practices adopted by other countries…Thus, globalization is transforming the state structures that deal with monetary policy” (1793).

Posen: Why Central Bank Independence does not Cause Low Inflation

Posen, Adam. (1993). "Why Central Bank Independence does not Cause Low Inflation: There is no Institutional Fix for Politics". In R. O'Brien (Ed.), Finance and the International Economy (pp. 41-66). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

There is increased zeal to make central banks independent and inflation fighters. It looks like it is a free lunch with the possible benefit of long-term economic growth. Posen argues that, “…the causal linkage between central bank independence and low inflation is illusory” (41). His claim is that it is, as the title of his piece indicates, a problem of politics.

“The institutional fix of an independent CB is supposed to offer protection from inflation through three mechanisms—increasing the credibility of commitments to prices stability, assuring a higher priority on inflation fighting in the net preference of the public sector, and putting up barriers to the monetization of government expenditure” (42). The first isn’t played out by the facts. The second may be slightly true, but CBs are also concerned about exchange rates and growth.

“An empirically supported explanation of the association between CB independence and low inflation can only be arrived at through a proper understanding of politics” (46). Democratic politics is not a tool that is going to settle institutional problems (as per his sub title to this section: Nothing Contentions is ever Settled in Democracies). Politically important and influential interest groups will always be involved in the creation of caustic institutions in certain political systems. This he calls the “interests not institutions” thesis (47).

“Financial sectors having universal banking are expected to have stronger anti-inflationary sentiment than those without,” and, “…the less regulatory power of the CB over the financial sector, the more strength of opposition to inflation by the sector is to be expected,” and, “Where a country’s party system is more fractionalized, financial expert opinion is expected to be less influential,” and, “…financial opposition to inflation is expected to be more effective in federal systems of government” (48-9).

“The fundamental argument of this paper, that there is no institutional ‘fix’ for the redistributive struggle over monetary policy, implies that CBs designed with similar degrees of statutory independence will offer significantly differing degrees of protection from inflation over time as they political situation alters” (53).

Down: Central Bank Independence, Disinflations, and the Sacrifice Ratio

Down, Ian. (2004). "Central Bank Independence, Disinflations, and the Sacrifice Ratio". Comparative Political Studies, 37(4), 399-434. http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/399

This study looks at CBI and the phenomena of disinflation to see if there are any costs to having an independent central bank that controls for inflation strictly. It had typically been seen that CBI controlling for inflation was a “free lunch”, and that there were no adverse economic costs. However, this study attempts to show that there are costs associated with CBI controlling for inflation, specifically in the realm of disinflation.

Disinflations are, “policy-induced reductions in inflation” (400). Down claims that, “the economic contraction that tends to accompany a disinflation appears to be more severe when a central bank is politically autonomous” (400). These periods of policy induced economic reverse can be associated with negative effects on societal welfare, increased unemployment, slow or negative economic growth and other explicitly distributional effects.

Down also deploys the sacrifice ratio, which measures, “the cost, in terms of either output or unemployment, of a point reduction in inflation. It thus measures the relative cost of a reduction in inflation: the higher the ratio, the greater the relative cost” (401). Down concludes that, “CBI is positively associated with the sacrifice ratio,” and that, “political and institutional factors play an important part in determining the costs of disinflations, particularly the unemployment costs” (401).

He finds that the inflation-output sacrifice ratio is highly and positively correlated to CBI disinflationary policies. More gradual disinflation is also more highly correlated to the sacrifice ratio. However, while there is a relationship, there is also no clear and universal relationship between either the inflation-output or the inflation-unemployment sacrifice ratios and Down claims that both must be investigated in more detail.

He then deploys a quantitative method for measuring the relationship between sacrifice ratios and disinflation. He creates four models and uses an OLS regression. He concludes that, “…the most striking result to emerge from the analyses is the robust positive relationship between CBI and the unemployment and output costs of disinflations” (430). “In sum, the relative inflation aversion of policy makers appears to increase the costs they are iwlling to impose on society to reduce inflation” (430). “Put simply, althought CBI may generate long-run gains for the economy, it does appear to be associated with greater short-run costs. This in turn suggests that CBI may not offer the unequivocal free lunch many believe accompanies greater independence” (432).

Watson: The Institutional Paradoxes of Monetary Orthodoxy

Watson, M. (2002). "The institutional paradoxes of monetary orthodoxy: reflections on the political economy of central bank independence". Review of International Political Economy, 9, 183-196. http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/rrip/2002/00000009/00000001/art00007

“Academic studies of central banking typically divide into one of two traditions. For some, central bankers have shown that, once trusted to operate policy autonomously, they can consistently deliver low and stable inflation at no obvious cost in terms of output and employment…For others, however, this is to overemphasize the economic dimension of CBI” (183). CBI, in effect, is a tool derived from the political realm. Watson is here concerned with examining the literature on CBI, then showing that CBI can lead or promote problematic policy and then attempts to show that CBI was an effect of political pushing and pulling as opposed to economic drivers.

“The core of the intellectual case for CBI revolves around the assumption of a persistent inflationary bias built into politicians’ monetary policy preferences” (184). “There are two broad political economy challenges to this standard economic conclusion: one empirical, the other conceptual…The first…challenge suggests that CBI leads to superior inflation performance only when it is accompanied by labour market institutions that facilitate solidaristic wage bargaining…In contrast, the second…challenge suggests that the orthodox economics account of CBI mis-specifies the whole nature of monetary relations within contemporary capitalism” (185).

Watson then looks at the idea of path-dependency in the creation of CBIs, as well as the idea of a Grand Theory of CBIs. He finds that general theories of this sort are problematic. “…each time a general theory has been identified, it has been a different ‘general’ theory, which means that none of them have been actual, time-invariant, general theories at all” (189). While inflationary pressure has always been around, the nature and drivers of this pressure has changed as time progresses. On page 190 he provides a nice list of inflationary pressures by decade from the 60s to the 90s highlighting the different drivers that caused the pressure.

He looks then at the political logics for CBI. First, he highlights the issue of domestic distribution and finds that CBI is clearly a driver of distinct distributional policies, as credit is, in his words, “the sine qua non of distributional policies” (193). Additionally, he highlights how CBI is an “automatic pilot for policy” (193). This helps to shape the perspectives and expectations of market actors, and also provides for an outlet for unpopular policy interventions.

His first, economic conclusion, is that the assumption that CBI will create independent inflationary control misses the point that, “Money supply growth is determined as much by the actions of the private sector acting in its own interests as by the central bank acting in the public interest” (194). His institutional conclusion is that it is doubtful that CBI is the best institution to control for inflation. His political conclusion is that, “The decision to cede operational responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy should be seen as a statement of social intent” (195).

Maxfield: Gatekeepers of Growth (Chapters 1-4)

Maxfield, Sylvia. (1997). Gatekeepers of growth : the international political economy of central banking in developing countries. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Maxfield examines the rise of central bank independence in the 90s and attempts to outline some of the drivers of this change. Firstly, the rise of central bank independence may seem counterintuitive, especially for someone who deploys a rationalist framework: why would political leaders give up control of such a powerful took that could effect their future power to such a great degree? Maxfield argues that the increasing globalization of financial markets if, “of central importance” (4). The cause of financial market’s increasing control over the independent decision making of politicians is the attempt to, “signal their [the politician’s] nation’s creditworthiness to potential investors” (4). “Specially, this book argues that the likelihood politicians will use central bank independence to try to signal creditworthiness is greater 1.) the larger their country’s need for balance of payments support, 2.) the greater the expected effectiveness of signaling, 3.) the more secure their tenure as politicians, and 4.) the fewer their country’s restrictions on international financial transactions” (4).

She then goes on to briefly, and helpfully, outline some of the main functions of central banks. “To control inflation policymakers seek an anchor for prices. The exchange rate system devised in Bretton Woods…provided an exchange rate anchor” (7). This broke down after the move to fiat money. This is one of the reasons that there needed to be a new anchor for the international financial system: central bank independence with a mandate to control for price flux.

One reason that central banks need to be independent is because market actors can anticipate the policy moves of politicized government groups more easily (8). Another reason is the great power of finance in the age of increased economic interdependence (9). Another reason that this has become a more important issue is the Maastricht Treaty for conformity with EU rules (10). The increasing focus on rationalism as a social science methodology helped to promote the move to central banks (11). There are “normative” arguments for the move to central banks, like increased economic performance, policy coordination, democratic accountability, though I found these to be a bit problematic (12-7).

Maxfield then goes on, in chapter 2 to highlight the political source of central bank independence (also the title of the chapter). She highlights different studies that identify different sources of the independence of central banks. Some identify the need for highly trained and independent technocrats. Some believe that there is more independence if there is less political polarization in a country, others if there is more. Some that sectors of the economy will press for independence because it is in their interest. Another main group looks at how central bank independence is contingent on the need of governments to raise finance. Yet another group looks at ideology as a factor in determining whether or not the central bank is independent.

“A potential explanation for the contradictory findings reported above is that financier’s abilities to exploit a nation’s international economic vulnerabilities shape the effectiveness of financial sector demands on government to protect central bank independence” (33).

She then highlights the ways in which international finance can incentivise the move on the part of states to make their central banks independent. She looks at FDI, foreign equity shares, international bank loans and foreign government bonds. She finds that the first three are relatively not going to effect the move towards an independent bank. However, foreign government bonds do much to signal a country’s creditworthiness to international finance.

The final chapters of the book examine different case studies. I did not read these.

Kirshner: The Political Economy of Low Inflation

Kirshner, Jonathan. (2001). "The Political Economy of Low Inflation". Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 41. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=4374154&site=ehost-live

First, Kirshner claims that the politics of low inflation have been under theorized by IPE scholars. He is about to remedy this problem by looking at current literature on the politics of inflation generally and focusing on three themes: “the economic costs of inflation, the concept of monetary neutrality from economic and political perspectives, and the importance of disaggregating economic growth statistics” (41). He then goes on to map out his approach to looking at the political implications of low inflation.

The first perspective on inflation examined is the sociological perspective. This sees inflation as an escape valve for societies to release sociological tension. “Inflation is a ‘bad thing’, although perhaps at times a necessary evil, because it is the symptom of underlying social conflicts within society” (43).

The next perspective examined is the neoclassical. This perspective emphasizes the assumption that inflation has economic costs. Actors will change their behavior in response to the perceived actions of governments in the face of inflationary pressures. “In order to avoid the costs of inflation and the pain of subsequent disinflation, it is crucial that monetary policy be de-politicized, that is, insulated from short term political pressures emanating from both interest groups and the government itself" (44).

The third perspective is that of the modern political economist. From this point of view the bad-guy is the state, who is responsible for inflationary pressures. From here, the state is looking out for its own interests, as an egoistic rent maximizer. “Inflation can help the government by increasing its wealth and by affecting its ability to stay in power” (44). Inflation can act as a tax on “cash holdings” (45). This causes the need to depoliticize the monetary process, thus the need for a central bank.

Kirshner then goes on to claim that most economic perspectives claim that there is an economic cost to inflation, but that this cost has never been empirically verified. He looks at literature and models on the subject and finds them to be inconclusive. “In sum, the deductive arguments regarding inflation are indeterminate” (48). “Thus, there is no good reason to believe that moderate inflation has a significant effect on economic performance, or that moderate inflation should be met with aggressive anti-inflationary policies” (50).

Then, why are there so many central banks being depoliticized, especially throughout the 90’s? “The solution to this puzzle is that the opposition to inflation lies in its political effects, not in its economic ones” (51). Inflation affects different groups differently. “Unanticipated inflation…benefits debtors at the expense of creditors, one reason why financiers have always been strong proponents of price stability” (52). The emphasis on price stability can be best understood through a micro-politics perspective, claims the author. From here, it becomes possible to see that there are distributional effects to inflation policy, and that these effects have real political consequences.

From the micro-politics perspective, “The level of inflation is the outcome of an interest group conflict regarding the level of inflation. The economic effects of inflation are dwarfed by these political factors” (59).

Notermans: Policy Continuity, Poilcy Change, and the Political Power fo Economic Ideas

Notermans, Ton. (1999). "Policy Continuity, Policy Change, and the Political Power of Economic Ideas". Acta Poiltica, 34(3), 22-48.

Notermans argues that changes in economic policy stem not from ideational forces, but from material forces. Ideational forces are brought into the picture to simply justify the policy decision. Additionally, different theoretical frameworks can be manipulated in various ways to justify the needed policy response to the material drivers that a nation confronts.

“This article argues that the view that new economic ideas determine the character of new policies reverses cause and effect. More specifically, three hypotheses are advanced: 1.) Ideas exert n independent causal influence on policies by providing for continuity rather than change because economic policy-makers cling to the ideas and policies that were adopted in response to a traumatic event, even if the original constellation justifying such policies has long disappeared. 2.) The changes in macroeconomic policy regimes during this century have been driven by the need to correct cumulative price level disturbances… 3.) Because the timing and character of a regime change is determined by developments in financial and labour markets, it is largely exogenous to the political system” (23).

“In spite of fundamental theoretical differences between the two approaches, it is possible to derive Keynesian-type policies from neoclassical views and vice versa” (26). Notermans believes that, no matter what ideational approach you use, you will be able to manipulate that to produce any economic policy result. This means that people are just responding to material forces, and that ideational forces are tossed about. Eventually, this can be seen as securing economic policy that is more in line with neoclassical models, which tend to reflect reality more accurately. “Hence, policy convergence with the (long-term) neoclassical model is complete: macroeconomic policies need to prioritize price stability, and unemployment is to be tackled by supply-side policies” (27).

Notermans posits in section 4 of his article that ideas do not have a causal influence, even if different policy makers who hold different ideas posit different policies. This could simply mean that their interests diverge and that they are responding to material forces that they encounter. After making this claim, Notermans goes on to say that, since ideas are insufficient to explain macroeconomic change within the economic policies of Europe, he will propose a Darwinian approach. This approach claims that ideas are not of interest, and only policies that respond to price stability will have any worth.

Only firms who respond to the dictates of the market will survive. However, a Darwinistic approach must take into account the idea of path-dependency, as opposed to pure environmental determinism. “…because the behavior an individual market actor faces is largely determined by the behavior of the other market actors, the case for environmental determination of economic outcomes is much weaker than commonly assumed” (32).

However, this aside, the current nature of the market necessitates price stability as the mechanism of Darwinistic selection and adaptation. “In a world where money serves as a store of value, price flexibility no longer necessarily serve s as the device through which markets will quickly return to equilibrium Instead, excessive changes of the general price level may severely disrupt the willingness to engage in productive activity and hence precipitate rather than mitigate economic crises” (33). Therefore, price stability is the holy grail, and markets will orientate around that for material reasons.

“Whereas ideas play no significant role in explaining regime changes, they do play an important role in accounting for regime inertia” (37). “In sum, to the extent that ideas do influence the development of macroeconomic management their influence is generally moderate as they tend to perpetuate a given regime even if the conditions which gave rise to that regime have long disappeared” (37).

Notermans goes on to highlight this ascertain by looking at the cases of Britain, France and Sweden and highlighting how their transitions towards policies of price stability reinforce his theses. However, he also notes that these characteristics are not always going to necessarily be in play, and that a different set of material forces could come along and change the way that economic policy is made.

Wendt: Social Theory of International Politics

Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

This text is lengthy, dense and complex. This abstract will highlight the structure of the book, key arguments and will ignore pieces that are not of personal interest. Hopefully I note when I am skipping over something, but that’s not guaranteed either.

Firstly, this text is a decisive move on Wendt’s part to crystallize a broader movement within IR theory. His constructivist argument is clear, complex and dense. He attempts to bring together different ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies. Typically, positivists and post-positivists would have little to talk about; Wendt lets these two groups know that they may have more in common then they have believed in the past.

This bridging of divides also may be part of the problem with his analysis. In part, he oversteps and simplifies the divergent opinions of those who embrace distinct ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies. For example, he claims that post-positivists are tacit realists because they look at the world around them and theorize about it. This may not be highly persuasive to someone who is attempting to highlight the aspects of positivism that they find ethically problematic.

However, while he may overstep in areas, he does an incredible job of presenting a theoretical framework that can be applied to real, IR problems.

Four sociologies of international politics:

“…students of international politics have increasingly accepted two basic tenants of ‘constructivism’: 1.) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and 2.) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (1).

Went separates theoretical questions into first-order questions and second-order questions. First-order questions are those that are domain specific. “It involves choosing a social system (family, Congress, international system), identifying the relevant actors and how they are structured, and developing propositions about what is going on” (6). “Second-order questions are questions of social theory” (5).

The four sociologies that Went describes are really two pairs: materialist/idealist and agent/structure. He believes that these two pairs can help us structure how theories have typically organized themselves. Wendt highlights a materialist discourse that focuses on human nature, natural resources, geography, forces of production and forces of destruction (23). On the other hand, “idealisats believe the most fundamental fact about society is the nature a structure of social consciousness (what I later call the distribution of ideas of knowledge)” (24). Also, he claims that, “Idealist social theory embodies a very minimal claim: that the deep structure of society is constituted by ideas rather than material forces” (25).

The second pair, or debate, is between agent and structure, which Wendt describes as being between individualism and holism. “Individualsim tends to be associated with causal effects on behavior, but I shall argue that the individualist view is compatible in principle with more possibilities than its critics…typically acknowledge…” (27). Holist theories, on the other hand, tend to view structure as having a much more important impact on the nature of IR.

Wendt then places these two debates onto a 2x2 chart, where, starting at point 0,0, and moving up the y axis, we first have the individualists and then the holists. Moving positively from 0,0 on the x axis, we have materialism and then ideationalism. These four boxes can then be used to categorize different IR theories. On page 32 there is a very helpful chart that plots dominant discourses in IR into different boxes.

Methodology, Wendt claims, can become ontology, if the theorist is not careful. He explains that realists and constructivists have very different methodologies which leads to his next point. He then goes on to claim that ontology is something that is crucial to the IR debate, and that there are key distinctions between the ontology of realists and constructivists. The reality of this debate ends up being an empirical question, which will not be answered here. Secondly, he claims to support an idealist ontology, a view that is in line with most post-positivists. However, this does not mean he believes in a post-positivist epistemology. “I am a positivist” (39). This could hardly be more clear.

“…I think that post-positivists put too much emphasis on epistemology, and that positivist should be more open-minded about questions and methodology” (40).

Scientific realisim and social kinds:

“How is it possible to adopt an idealist and holist ontology while maintaining a commitment to science, or positivism broadly understood? This chapter constructs the ‘via media’ that grounds my modernist constructivism” (47). How indeed.

This is accomplished by positing that, while the world is unobservable, it is still knowable. This supports his positivism. Theories also provide knowledge about things that are unknowable. He also posits an “Ultimate Argument for Realism” that claims that we are slowly approaching the deep, real structure of the world out there. Also, science has allowed us to control the world around us in ways that were not possible earlier. Also, this is where post-positivists are actually positivist, because they look at empirical facts about the world as opposed to positing…purple. “In the end, we are all realists in practice, it would seem that epistemological anxiety makes little difference to our study of the world” (67).

Also, Wendt believes and makes the case in this chapter that social life is social life ‘all the way down’ (90), though he will make this case more forcefully in subsequent chapters.

An important quote from this chapter, and one that helps to highlight his intention in building bridges, or, in his terms, creating “via media”: “But the point is that everyone gets to do what they do: from a realist stance epistemology cannot legislate scientific practice” (91).

“Ideas all the way down?”:

“…the goal of this chapter is to show that much of the apparent explanatory power of ostensibly ‘materialist’ explanations is actually constituted by suppressed constructivist assumptions about the content and distribution of ideas” (95-6). “…I argue that brute material forces have some effects on the constitution of power and interests, and as such my thesis is not ideas all the way down…my defense of this ‘rump’ materialism is rooted in scientific realism’s naturalistic approach to society…” (96). “In my view it cannot be ideas all the way down because scientific realism shows that ideas are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality” (110). “…proposing a rule o thumb for idealists: when confronted by ostensibly ‘material’ explanations, always inquire into the discursive conditions which make them work” (135).

He argues here that interests are mainly a construction of decisions that are made by agents that are forged by mostly ideational drivers. However, while the ideational driver is very important, it does not, as some post-positivists claim, go “all the way down”. This means that there are root material forces that construct situations in certain ways. There are 5 material forces that he highlights in this chapter.

Structure, agency and culture:

Wendt claims that any social system will contain the three characters in this chapter’s title. A social system is analyzable on these three axes. He looks at much in this chapter, including culture, micro and macro structure as well as the causal or constitutive effects of culture. He wants to give both agency and structure, or, if you’ll remember from the earlier chapter, both holism and individualism, equal weight in the understanding of culture. “…structure exists, has effects, and evolves only because of agents and their practices” (185). I did not read this chapter in great detail.

The state and the problems of corporate agency:

“In this chapter I argue that states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs and intentionality” (197). “The essential state has five properties: 1.) an institutional-legal order, 2.) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, 3.) an organization with sovereignty, 4.) a society and, 5.) territory” (202). Wendt goes through these five characteristics fleshing each out.

This chapter also attempted to highlight the interests of these bodies as well as the continued problems of anthropomorphizing states.

Three cultures of anarchy:

Wendt has previously written about the international system of anarchy in the journal article “Anarchy is what states make of it”. Anarchy can have multiple logics in Wendt’s construction, and this it, “is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside them” (249).

He looks at the Hobbsian, Kantian and Lokean version of the world and thus you have your three anarchies. I will not go into them, though they are quite interesting.

He ends this chapter with this odd statement: “But with respect to its endogenous dynamic, the argument suggests that the history of international politics will be unidirectional: if there are any structural changes, they will be historically progressive. Thus, even if there is no guarantee that the future of the international system will be better than its past, at least there is reason to think it will not be worse” (312). I <3>

Process and structural change:

“Agents and structures are themselves processes, in other words, on-going ‘accomplishments of practice.’ Ultimately this is the basis for the claim that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’” (313). “This chapter is organized into three main parts. Drawing on interactionist social theory, in the first section I develop a general, evolutionary model of identity formation, showing how identities are produced and reproduced in the social process. In the next section I argue that structural change in international politics involves collective identity formation. Putting these two sections together, I then advance a simple causal theory of collective identity formation under anarchy, containing four ‘master’ variables that can be realized in multiple ways in real world international systems: interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint” (317).

Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism: The Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie

(Arendt, 2004)

Arendt, H. (2004). The origins of totalitarianism (1st ed.). New York: Schocken Books.

The Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie

This chapter outlines the development of society towards a system of imperialism. This occurs through the “emancipation” of the bourgeoisie politically, as they become more active and promote their interests.

The bourgeoisie where the, “…first class in history to achieve economic preeminence without aspiring to political rule” (167). This transition marks the first stage in the transition to imperialist economic and political policies. In previous stages of development, this class left the decisions of policy to the state, as long as these groups protected their property rights and thus left a milieu for business interests to take place.

“Imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against national limitations to its economic expansion. The bourgeoisie turned to politics out of economic necessity; for if it did not want to give up the capitalist system whose inherent law is constant economic growth, it had to impose this law upon its home governments and to proclaim expansion to be an ultimate political goal of foreign policy” (170).

Arendt criticizes the movement towards imperialism in the early 20^th century as not having the same moral authority as earlier movements towards empire, specifically she mentions Rome and the empire moves of Alexander the Great. Those classical empires were not an export of capital for profit (entirely), but rather an export of law, culture and people. The two differ in their quality and their substance. “What imperialists actually wanted was expansion of political power without the foundation of a body politic” (181).

As the bourgeoisie class continued to save and accumulate capital, outlets for investments domestically dwindled. This is one of the drivers of the imperialist need to invest abroad in under developed markets. “Imperialism must be considered the first stage in political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism” (185).

She goes on to bring Hobbes into her argument, positing that the bourgeoisie class was the first to really take his teachings and bring them both to the political and economic sphere. “Power…is the accumulated control that permits the individual to fix prices and regulate supply and demand in such a way that they contribute to his own advantage…therefore, if man is actually driven by nothing but his individual interests, desire for power must be the fundamental passion of man” (187).

The emerging society was one of power and not of rights. The relationship between the state and bourgeoisie society shifted, with the later being chiefly concerned with their own power through amassed capital, and the former being destined to bring about the latter’s security and freedom from crime, etc. “This process of never-ending accumulation of power necessary for the protection of a never-ending accumulation of capital determined the ‘progressive’ ideology of the late nineteenth century and foreshadowed the rise of imperialism” (191). “The so-called accumulation of capital which gave birth to the bourgeoisie changed the very conception of property and wealth: they were no longer considered to be the results of accumulation and acquisition but their beginnings; wealth became a never-ending process of getting wealthier” (193).

“Death is the real reason why property and acquisition can never become a true political principle” (194).

“Hobbes was the true, though never fully recognized, philosopher of the bourgeoisie because he realized that acquisition of wealth conceived as a never-ending process can be guaranteed only by the seizure of political power, for the accumulation process must sooner or later force open all existing territorial limits” (195).

She ends this section of her work by tracing out a gradual decline of industrialized nations and a movement towards base nationalism. This decline can also be seen in Lenin’s account of the inner-decay of imperialist countries.

Gramsci: Selections from the Prison Notebooks (pp. 245-76)

Gramsci, A., Hoare, Q., & Nowell-Smith, G. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. London,: Lawrence & Wishart.

“…there exists an art as well as a science of politics" (251).

Gramsci begins this brief selection from Selections From the Prison Notebooks by making a comment about separations of powers: “…is a product of the struggle between civil society and political society in a specific historical period. This period is characterized by a certain unstable equilibrium between the classes, which is a result of the fact that certain categories of intellectuals…are still too closely tied to the old dominant classes” (245).

The process of socialization, or the important power of ideas, is one feature that shapes Gramsci’s thought. “If every State tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization and of citizen…and to eliminate certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others, then the Law will be its instrument for this purpose” (246).

The State is controlled by those who are in power in civil society. “In reality, the State must be conceived of as an ‘educator’, in as much as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilization” (247). The power is exerted, when it can be, through socialization. When it can not be, it is imposed by Law. “The Law is the repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilizing activity undertaken by the State” (247).

“Political intuition is not expressed through the artist, but through the ‘leader’; and ‘intuition’ must be understood to mean not ‘knowledge of men’, but swiftness in connecting seemingly disparate facts, and in conceiving the means adequate to particular ends—thus discovering the interests involved, and arousing the passions of men and directing them towards a particular action” (252). Power is not crude deployment of material resource, but rather though ideational influence.

The Ethical State: “…every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level…which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes” (258).

Ability of a group to have influence in society without having to take the power of the state is Gramscian hegemony. “State = political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (263).

“The expressions ‘ethical State’ or ‘civil society’ would thus mean that this ‘image’ o fa Satat without a State was present to the greatest political and legal thinkers, in so far as they placed themselves on the terrain of pure science…” (263).

“A totalitarian policy is aimed precisely: 1. at ensuring that the members of a particular party find in that party all the satisfaction that they formerly found in a multiplicity of organizations, i.e. at breaking all the threads that bind these members to extraneous cultural organisms; 2. at destroying all other organizations or at incorporating them into a system of which the party is the sole regulator. This occurs: 1. when the given party is the bearer of a new culture—then one has a progressive phase; 2. when the given party wishes to prevent another force, bearer of a new culture, from becoming itself ‘totalitarianism’—then one has an objectively regressive and reactionary phase, even if that reaction (as invariably happens) does not avow itself, and seeks itself to appear as a bearer of a new culture” (265).

“..hegemony and dictatorship are indistinguishable, force and consent are simply equivalent; one cannot distinguish political society from civil society; only the State, and of course the State-as-government, exists, etc” (271).

Lenin: Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism

Lenin, Vladimir Il Ich. (1996). Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism: Pluto Press.

This text, originally published in 1916, explains a historical materialist perspective on the imperialism of the early twentieth century. Lenin describes how imperialism is a late, in his word “moribund” stage of capitalist development that came about after the monopolization of production domestically and the need to search for markets abroad. This eventually led to the partition of the globe into different spheres of economic and political influence which also contributed to imperialist wars either between different imperial powers or to subdue native populations.

The first chapter of this book is used to outline the beginning development of late capitalist production’s tendency towards monopolization. “The enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid process of concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises represents one of the most characteristic features of capitalism” (11). Enterprises grow, eat other enterprises and eventually become monopolies. These grow into cartels and these cartels eventually grow and become imperial in nature. Another characteristic of this production is that it has become social—the factory has grown to the size of a corporate, social endeavor—however, the “appropriation remains private” (20).

The second chapter is dedicated to the new role of the bank in this late capitalist development. However, because this industry also has a tendency to monopolize, “they become powerful monopolies having at their command almost the whole of the money capital of all the capitalists and small businessmen and also a large part of the means of production and of the sources of raw materials of the given country and in a number of countries” (27). This development both highlights and promotes the next driver of imperialism that Lenin highlights: that of finance capital.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to this factor. “Capitalism, which began its development with petty usury capital, ends its development with gigantic usury capital” (52). Countries are now able to, with the power that they wield through their consolidated banks and finance capital, sit back and lend money to industry which goes out and invests and is productive. The financier sits back and reaps the rewards while having not produced anything.

Chapter 4 looks at the process of exporting capital abroad. “Under the old capitalism, when free competition prevailed, the export of goods was the most typical feature. Under modern capitalism, when monopolies prevail, the export of capital has become the typical feature” (61). Lenin also criticizes those who would like to redistribute the profit to those who are less well off. He says that, “…if capitalism did these things it would not be capitalism; for uneven development and wrenched conditions of the masses are fundamental and inevitable conditions and premises of this mode of production. As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will never be utilized for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline in the profits for the capitalist” (62).

The next chapter is titled, “The division of the world among capitalist combines”. The word “combine” here should be read as the word “cabal”. At this even higher stage of capitalist production, “we see plainly here how private monopolies and state monopolies are bound up together in the age of finance capital; how both are but separate links in the imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the division of the world” (72-3).

The next chapter deals with the colonial division of the globe by the superpowers of Lenin’s time. He makes a point that there is a deterministic link between the movement from monopoly capitalism, to finance capitalism and then to colonialism (79). He also highlights how different proletariat groups are united under their imperialist flag, and against the internationalist cause (80). While colonialism has existed at least since the Romans, this is the first time that all of the raw materials were held in the hands of so few private interests.

Chapter 7 is about imperialism and how it represents a unique stage in the development of capitalism. The briefest definition of imperialism by Lenin is that of monopoly capitalism, but this is too parsimonious. He lists 5 characteristics: 1. concentration of production in monopolies; 2. merging of bank and industrial capital; 3. export of capital; 4. international capitalist monopolies dominate and divide globe; 5. territorial separation of world by capitalist powers. (90). This then leads to a struggle amongst existing world imperial powers and newly arrived imperial powers (see Japan in the early 20^th century) (98).

Chapter 8 regards the decay of capitalism, and highlights an earlier theme of laziness and usury. There is, in Lenin’s eyes, a tendency to stagnation and decay. Chapter 9 is a critique of imperialism focusing on its ineffectual nature. Chapter 10 places imperialism in a historical context and argues against other theorists who do not conform to Lenin’s theoretical framework.

Lenin: State and Revolution

Lenin, Vladimir Il Ich. (1935). State and revolution, Marxist teaching about the theory of the state and the tasks of the proletariat in the revolution. New York,: International publishers.

Originally written in 1917, this text has done much to formulate an orthodox Marxist interpretation of the state, and the transition from capitalist society to communist society. The text deals explicitly with Engle’s formulation of the “withering away of the state” and attempts to resuscitate its understanding from the jaws of critics of Marxism.

Firstly, Lenin must define and describe what characterizes a state. “The state is the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where, and to the extent that the class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled” (8 emphasis in original). The state is the mediator of class difference and class tension. In the bourgeois-democratic state of Lenin’s time, the state was also, “an organ of domination of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode” (9 emphasis in original).

The state must have a territory. It also must have an aspect of armed power. “Engles develops the conception of that ‘power’ which is termed the state—a power arising from society, but placing itself above it and becoming more and more separate from it. What does this power mainly consist of? It consists of special bodies of armed men who have at their disposal prisons, etc.” (10).

“In the Communist Manifesto are summed up the general lessons of history, which force us to see in the state the organ of class domination, and lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the proletariat cannot overthrow the bourgeoisie without first conquering political power, without obtaining political rule, without transforming the state into the ‘proletariat organized as the ruling class’; and that this proletarian state will begin to wither away immediately after its victory, because in a society without class antagonisms, the state is unnecessary and impossible” (25 emphasis in original).

“A Marxist is one who extends the acceptance of class struggle to the acceptance of the dictatorship of the proletariat” (30 emphasis in original).

“The forms of bourgeois states are exceedingly variegated, but their essence is the same: in one way or another, all these states are in the last analysis inevitably a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly bring a great variety and abundance of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be only one: the dictatorship of the proletariat” (31).

This transition is directly tied to the concept of democracy, which Lenin goes on to describe as true equality. “Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich—that is the democracy of capitalist society” (72). “Marx splendidly grasped the essence of capitalist democracy, when, in analyzing the experience of the Commune, he said that the oppressed were allowed, once every few years, to decide which particular representatives of the oppressing class should be in parliament to represent and repress them!” (73). It only becomes possible to truly address the concept of freedom in Lenin’s construction through the withering of the state.

“The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i.e., of all states, is only possible through ‘withering away’ (20 emphasis in original).

The first phase of Communist society, a society that is described as “coming out of the womb of capitalism” (76), involves the transition of the means of production out of the hands of private interests and into the hands of the multitude. However, equality will be difficult to achieve, as different people produce differently and have different needs. “The state will wither away completely [and the higher phase of Communist society will be achieved] when society has realized the rule: ‘From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs’” (79). Socialism can be called the lower phase of development and Communism for the higher phase.

Mosley: Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States

Mosley, Layna. (2000). "Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States". International Organization, 54(4), 737-773. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28200023%2954%3A4%3C737%3ARTMIFM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F

To what degree does increased capital mobility influence governments? “To what extent does international capital mobility limit government policy choices?” (737). “I argue that the influence of international financial markets on the governments of advanced industrial democracies is somewhat strong, but also somewhat narrow. Capital market openness allows participants in financial markets to react dramatically to changes in government policy outcomes. Market participants, however, consider only a small set of government policies when deciding how to allocate their assets. Therefore, governments face pressures to adopt market-pleasing policies in aggregate policy areas but retain ‘room to move’ in many other policy areas” (737).

Mosley then goes on to look at the recent literature on private economic agents and their influence on governments. She categorizes this literature into two groups: convergence and divergence (738). “Convergence scholars argue that growing trade and financial internationalization seriously impinge on government policy autonomy. At one extreme, global markets become masters over governments and eviscerate the authority of national states” (738). On the other hand, people who write in the divergence vein, “take issue with the theoretical framework and empirical evidence implying cross-national convergence” (738). This school of thought sees increased financial capital movement as increasing the need of individual governments to step in and create mitigating policy. Mosley concludes that both of these schools of thought are flawed because, “little of this research explores the causal mechanisms underlying government policy selection” (739).

Mosley argues that the, “influence of financial markets on government policy choice is ‘strong but narrow’” (740). She goes on and deploys her methodology: she is looking at interest rate premiums. She wants to identify drivers of change in the levels that these rates are charged to governments, or, “the price of policy divergence” (740). She then looks at three aspects of “financial market influence on government,” “the level of international capital mobility, the use of similar indicators by a range of market participants, and financial market participants’ incentives to collect and employ information” (741).

Her methodology involves interviews with those involved in the financial sector. She does this for the three factors of influence described above, as well as for three additional factors. She then looks at quantitative data regarding financial market influence. She wants to see if the interviews conform to data on the ground in their effect on interest rates.

She then looks at how government policy responds to changes in the institution of finance capital. “First, other things being equal, governments will be less willing to pursue policies that are more costly…Second, the impact of interest rates on the domestic economy, and on government actions, might differ cross-nationally” (764). “Third, we can expect governments to consider the impact of changes in interest rates on debt financing costs” (765).

Conclusion (in part): “Despite financial globalization, the motivations for many government policies remain rooted in domestic politics and institutions. Governments concede to financial market pressures in a few areas, but they retain autonomy in any other areas. Moreover, evidence regarding market participants’ use of the Maastricht criteria suggest that, under certain conditions, governments are quite capable of manipulating financial market behavior” (766).

Important question, and highlight of limited scope of project: “…what might these findings reveal about financial market influences in the developing world?”

Chwieroth: Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets

Chwieroth, Jeffrey. (2007). "Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets". International Organization, 61(2), 443-463. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=25008468&site=ehost-live

This paper focuses on the rise of finance capital mobility and one aspect of ideational drivers that can account for this movement away from capital controls. “What this view overlooks [the view that the implementation of capital controls from a policy perspective is indeterminate] is that capital mobility—as with all material trends—must be socially mediated and interpreted by policymakers” (444). Chwieroth then attempts to map out the movement, increase and influence of groups of neoliberal economists as they are placed in positions of policy control in different countries and how this effects the relevance of capital controls. “When these economists form a coherent policy making team, capital account policy is more likely to be liberalized” (445).

The first stage of his methodology explores the drivers of job appointments. Here he finds, “that both credibility concerns and political interests matter” (445). The second stage of this methodology, “indicate[s] that formation of a coherent policymaking team of neoliberal economists significantly influenced the decision to liberalize” (445).

In explaining “epistemic communities and policy reforms”, Chwieroth highlights the beneficial process of orthodoxy in promoting policy: “In the absence of competing ideas to guide policy, coherence ensures consistent advice and increases the likelihood that the chief of government and other politicians will view the interpretations these economists offer as ‘correct’,” (447). “Coherence also increases the insulation of policymakers from societal demands by shielding the decision-making process from alternative views” (447).

There is then a brief sketch of the movement from a Keynesian approach which highlighted the possible necessity of capital controls and their historic benefit on developing countries to a neoliberal emphasis on the freedom of the restraint of capital controls. “Despite ambiguous empirical basis for capital account liberalization in emerging markets, neoliberal economists also often present their recommendations as the only ‘credible’ policy available to appease market sentiment” (450).

Chwieroth then goes on to test this hypothesis using mainly indicators of capital account openness as well as degree of neoliberalness in policy advocation. The methodology seems solid, though I skimmed over it mostly. The conclusion was that, basically, his hypothesis stood on solid ground. More neoclassical economists created a need for the appointment of more neoclassical economists and thus more neoliberal economic policy.

He concludes that, “the results suggest that existing explanations of capital account liberalization are incomplete” and that, “the results suggest the conclusion that economists are an important conduit through which ideas diffuse and are implemented into policy” (459).

Goodman & Pauly: The Obsolescence of Capital Controls?

Goodman, John B., & Pauly, Louis W. (1993). "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls?: Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets". World Politics, 46(1), 50-82. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28199310%2946%3A1%3C50%3ATOOCCE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3

“In this article, our principle aim is to address two prior puzzles: First, why did policies of capital decontrol converge across a rising number of industrial states between the late 1970s and the early 1990s? Second, why did some states move to eliminate controls more rapidly than others?” The answers to these questions are not the result of broad, ideational shifts on the part of improving the lot of capital mobility. However, these changes can be identified with broader structural changes in, “international production and financial intermediation, which made it easier and more urgent for private firms…effectively to pursue strategies of evasion and exit. For governments, the utility of controls declined as their perceived cost thereby increased” (51).

This article then goes on to outline why this conclusion is the correct one by looking at the cases of movements away from capital controls in Japan, German, France and Italy. Special attention is paid to why these movements occurred at different times in different countries, and the conclusions that are drawn are congruent with the broader conclusions of the paper.

It is clear in this paper that, “global financial structures affect the dynamics of national policy-making by changing and privileging the interests and actions of certain types of firms” (52). This privileging of interest and actions on the domestic level can be seen clearly in the ways in which finance capital interests neglect and evade capital controls when they can. This practice of “evasion and exit” can eventually prove too costly for a country to combat. Thus, they are forced to remove their capital controls.

Initially, this article makes clear that capital controls were a part of the Bretton Woods international economic structure. They were seen as being a crucial tool that domestic economies could use to reign in capital flight and to rebuild. This was even, and still the case with the IMF Articles of Agreement in 1976.

In the 1970s, “two developments dramatically reduced the usefulness of capital controls. The first was the transformation and rapid growth of international financial markets…Just as these changes were occurring, a related development was taking place—an increasing number of businesses were moving toward a global configuration” (57). Both of these changes changed the cost benefit analysis that a nation could use when they were deciding whether or not to implement capital controls. While there were other factors that played roles in this development, these were mainly secondary roles (80).

Frieden: Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (Chapter 15)

Frieden, Jeffry A. (2006). Global capitalism : its fall and rise in the twentieth century (1st ed.). New York: W.W. Norton. (Chapter 15)

This chapter is an interesting and lively telling of the causes and the tension surrounding the movement away from the gold standard by Nixon in August of 1971. This policy change represented the unraveling of the Bretton Woods agreement made amongst many of the Western Allies in the last stages of WWII. Part of this agreement was that the US dollar would be convertible to gold at the rate of 35$ per ounce.

The decision was made by Nixon amid pressure from both the international monetary order and domestic policies. The expectation was that the dollar would be devalued. This was causing a run on the dollar, as people tried to convert it to gold before the devaluation occurred. The US could have countered this effect. This would have involved a, “raise in interest rates, cut spending, restrain wages and profits, and drive the economy into recession” (340).

After Nixon made the move to fiat money, the dollar devalued rapidly. However, everything returned to normal after successive devaluations in 1973. This effectively killed the Bretton Woods agreement.

“The Bretton Woods system combined freedom to address national concerns with international economic integration” (342). It was an agreement born out of WWII. It created a situation that Frieden highlights as eventually causing the following trends that eventually brought about its own demise. Firstly, it created a regime whereby international finance could gain footing, strength and influence. The second change that brought about the death of Bretton Woods, as highlighted by Frieden, was the pressure that was subsequently placed on the dollar by the strength of economic recovery, especially in Japan and Western Europe.

Eventually, the cause of the rupture in the international monetary order stemmed from the success of the Bretton Woods agreement, and because the US eventually placed domestic economic policies above the international agreements regarding gold convertibility. “The US government was simply unwilling to trim its economy to fit its currency commitments under the Bretton Woods system and chose instead to bring the system to an end” (346).

The effects of the movement away from gold convertibility were seen throughout the world. Some of these effects able to be felt in policies that evolved to create nationalist economic protection in developed countries that did not rely on the antiquated gold standard. Other effects were occurring in less developed countries. The process of development in the 70’s can be seen generally to have caused deficits, inflation, political upheaval, urbanization and inequality. These effects were not universal, as East Asia was able to escape them to a degree. Additionally, Frieden highlights the changes in the socialist world in the 70’s and the insecurity that arose there.

“The postwar era ended in the early 1970s. The developed capitalist world had come out of World War II with a compromise that blended international economic integration with national policy independence, the market with the welfare state” (359). This sounds much like Ruggie’s Embedded Liberalism thesis. The 70’s represented a rupture away from post WWII development. Frieden ends by making the claim that, while the 70’s saw a hemorrhage in the development of developed countries, less developed countries and socialist countries, this was after each of these respective groups were very successful in achieving what they wanted after WWII: respectively, an international trade and finance integration, industrialization, and industrialization.

Campbell: National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia

Campbell, David. (1998). National deconstruction : violence, identity, and justice in Bosnia. Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press.

Though this book is not without its problems, it is an interesting and helpful application of deconstructivist reasoning and methodology in the field of international relations. The thesis is basically this: a positivist project of maps, census and history created a situation whereby the possibilities of responding to the tensions in the former Yugoslavia were constructed in such a way that they caused great harm and death. Campbell posits the ways in which the story could have been told differently, and how this may have gone a great distance to solving the problem with relatively less loss of life.

He begins by telling a couple of different stories from people after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The most striking is that of a Bosnian Muslim who says, “I am a Muslim…but I didn’t know that before the war. Before the war, of course, we were all atheists!” (1). This initially highlights the possible accounts that one could give regarding this conflict that were not part of the hegemonic discourse.

Campbell then goes on to discuss an Ethos of Political Criticism, the heart of the methodology. This ethos involves, “an effort to disturb those practices that are settled, untie what appears to be sewn up, and render as produced that which claims to be naturally emergent” (4). This is explicitly an effort to deconstruct.

We are then taken through some of the criticism that has been piled onto the “post-structural” school of though by other IR theorists. This criticism tends to be silly at best, and clearly indicates the critic’s lack of familiarity with the text(s). Deconstructivism is seen as leading directly to nihilism, in that it makes the ability to take action impossible.

In contrast to instrumental rationality, which is seen as not being a sufficient barrier to guarantee against totalitarianism, Campbell’s method, “aims to demonstrate that the settled norms of international society—in particular, the idea that the national community requires the nexus of demarcated territory and fixed identity—were not only insufficient to enable a response to the Bosnian war, they ere complicit in and necessary for the conduct of the war itself” (13).

One important move that Campbell makes is to identify identities with performance, and thus to take the ideational realm and make it apply to the material. “First and foremost among the onto-political assumptions of deconstructive thought is the concept of the performative constitution of identity” (24). “The performative constitution of identity is central to rethinking the relationship between violence and the political, especially in the context of the state” (25).

Then, the concept of ontopology is deployed. This is used as a method for mapping out the narratives, the “enplotment”, according to Hayden White, vis-à-vis the history of the Balkans. He then outlines the history of the conflict in terms of conflicting narratives that all still highlight the entrenched nature of historical assumptions of sovereignty, ethnicity and conflict. This is where the “bad” occurred that leads to more death in the Bosnian war.

There is a discussion of ethics and Lévinas. “’responsibility [is] the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity. For I describe subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics…does not supplement a preceding existential base; the very note of the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as responsibility.’ Of these concepts, responsibility is perhaps the most important because, for Lévinas, being is a radically interdependent condition, a condition made possible only because of my responsibility to the other” (173).

He then goes over Derrida and moves towards a pursuit of democracy. This is where the methodology and the text run into themselves. If we are fighting against power structures, and critique the modern project of rationality because it can not guarantee against fascism, why would we want to throw up such an empty topic as democracy? How do we make this practical? If anything, democracy has lead to horrible crimes being committed as well as other systems of government.

The final chapter outlines ways in which the conflict in Bosnia could have occurred differently, assuming that the deconstructive methodology were followed from the beginning. All in all, a compelling read that does a nice job of melding method and practice, though there are some gaps.

Žižek : Welcome to the Desert of the Real!

Žižek, Slavoj. (2002). Welcome to the desert of the real! : five essays on 11 September and related dates. London ; New York: Verso.

As with many books that I would attempt to summarize, this contains much too much content to do justice in such an abbreviated space. However, because I find this quite helpful, I plod on.

“We ‘feel free’ because we lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom…our ‘freedoms’ themselves serve to mask and sustain our deeper unfreedom” (2). We are asked, in our enlightened societies, to understand that we are free, but this freedom is also masked by an unfreedom, a requirement to obey, to conform, etc. The same is for the choice of democracy or fundamentalism: you are free to choose whatever you would like, as long as it is liberal democracy. See Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, etc.

This book reads like another Zizek book that I read, Iraq: Borrowed Kettle. It is full of striking insights that challenge the reader on each turn, but it bounces from one to another with such speed and seeming haste that it is less simple to string together a coherent theme. That may just be the point.

He talks about the passion for the real that has engulfed our society, and it can be seen everywhere. We want the real so much that it has become unreal. We drink coffee without caffeine, we have beer without alcohol, we have wars without (our) deaths. In fact, the title of the book comes from the scene in the Matrix when Neo is first confronted with real reality (i.e., outside the scope of the computer’s overt control).

This passion for the real is identified as having a core, and this is, “this identification with—this heroic gesture of fully assuming—the dirty obscene underside of Power: the heroic attitude of ‘Somebody has to do the dirty work, so let’s do it!’, a kind of mirror-reversal of the Beautiful Soul which refuses to recognize itself in its result. We find this stance also in the properly Rightist admiration for the celebration of heroes who are ready to do the necessary dirty work: it is easy to do a noble thing for one’s country, up to sacrificing one’s life for it-it is much more difficult to commit a crime for one’s country…” (30).

This helps to transition to Agamben’s Homo Sacer, the person who can be killed but not sacrificed, the living dead. The passion for the real leads some to be treated differently, as existing entirely outside of the law.

He then looks at the “clash of civilization” thesis that has been punted around since Huntington. He rejects this in favor of a clash within civilizations: The anthrax scare was more than likely the cause of Rightist fundamentalists, for example. It isn’t Bush verses Bin Laden, it is all of us against them. Also, there are those who operate between the civilizations, who take up an almost National Homo Sacer position, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Zizek then examines happiness, claiming that it is the betrayal of desire, and giving three ways in which the Czechoslovakian population of the 70s and 80s was happy: their material needs were satisfied, there was the Party to blame for things that didn’t go well and there was the “Other Place…which one was allowed to dream about, and even visit sometimes” (59). This was all disturbed by desire.

We then are taken on a general critique of liberal democracies and tolerance. One must understand that tolerance is not an absolute, and that a society doesn’t need both strong and weak, rich and poor, victim and torturer. He then goes on to introduce a contemporary version of Homo Sacer: Homo Sucker.

“In the good old German Democratic Republic, it was impossible for the same person to combine three features: conviction ()belief in the official ideology), intelligence, and honesty. If you believed and were intelligent, you were not honest; if you were intelligenta dn honest, you were not a believer; if you were a believer and honest, you were not intelligent. Does not the same also hold for the ideology of liberal democracy? If you (pretend to) take the hegemonic liberal ideology seriously, you cannot be both intelligent and honest: you are either stupid or a corrupted cynic. So, if I may indulge in a rather tasteless allusion to Agamben’s Homo sacer, I can risk the claim that the predominant liberal mode of subjectivity today is Homo sucker: while he tries to exploit and manipulate others, he ends up being the ultimate sucker himself. When we think we are making fun of the ruling ideology, we are merely strengthening its hold over us” (71).

There is a continued critique of liberal democracy, with the final section of the 3^rd chapter making an interesting argument. Regarding the murder of Pim Fortuyn, the Dutch politician who was a blend of Rightist populism and political correctness could not be allowed to live. He was, at the same time, gay, friendly with immigrants, and yet held a Le Pen attitude towards further immigration. “…perhaps he had to die because he was living proof that the opposition between Rightist populism and liberal tolerance is a false one, that we are dealing with two sides of the same coin. Should we not, therefore, be striving for the exact opposite of the unfortunate Fortuyn: not the Fascist with a human face, but the freedom fighter with an inhuman face?” (82).

He continues on to skewer the US and their position on torture, how future wars are not to be fought between nations, but between armies and groups of Homo Sacer, how liberals worked to open the discussion to torture (I’m against it, but…), how we all may be Homo Sacer at the end of the day, etc.

How to break out of this? He highlights the case of IDF forces who refused to fight. This represented an ethical act, an act that ruptured the hegemonic discourse of Israel enjoining the Palestinian armed forces to keep their people under control, then attacking when they can not, then blaming the armed forces for not keeping control and attacking IDF forces. “The point is simply that the IDF reservists’ refusal revealed an aspect of the situation which totally undermines the simple opposition of civilized liberal Israelis fighting Islamic fanatics: the aspect precisely, of reducing a whole nation to the status of Homo sacer, submitting them to a network of written and unwritten regulations which deprive them of their autonomy as members of a political community” (126-7).

The attacks of 9/11 did not represent an evil that was any greater than any other major global tragedy, as they have been made out to represent. They were an attempt to awake the Nietzscian Last Man from his eternal “bliss”.

And much more…