Feldstein, M. 1998. Refocusing the IMF. Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2: 20-33.
"The IMF's recent emphasis on imposing major structural and institutional reforms as opposed to focusing on balance-of-payments adjustments will have adverse consequences in both the short term and the more distant future. The IMF should stick to its traditional task of helping countries cope with temporary shortages of foreign exchange and with more sustained trade deficits" (20).
"Today's emphasis on structural and institutional reforms has not always been part of IMF programs. The IMF was founded in 1945 to help operate a system of fixed exchange rates, in which all currencies were pegged to the dollar, in turn fixed with respect to gold, that experts then considered necessary to encourage international trade. Although that system succeeded temporarily, differences in inflation between countries forced many to alter their currency values. When the fixed system collapsed completely in 1971, the IMF was forced to find a new raison d'être" (20).
Their new motivation can be seen as building from the Mexico financial crisis. Mexico indicated that it would be unable to satisfy its international commitments. If they were to default on this loan, that had the potential to push many US banks into insolvency, as it would have wiped out a substantial chunk of credit. The US provided a bridge loan to Mexico so that they would be able to pay back these loans eventually. Many of the loans that were about to be defaulted upon were restructured. This was not only accomplished in Mexico, but in Central and South America more generally.
In order to meet these restructured loans, countries embarked on a process of increasing exports and decreasing imports in order to earn foreign exchange. The IMF was a part of overseeing that restructuring of these economies towards a goal of accruing more international capital was proceeding smoothly.
The next step in IMF development involved country restructuring after the fall of the Soviet Union. The IMF brought much experience to countries that had little experience with market based economic decisions. It also did not hurt that their advice came with substantial financial incentives to adopt these market orientated policies.
"The IMF is now acting in Southeast Asia and Korea in much the same way that it did in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: insisting on fundamental changes in economic and institutional structures as a condition for receiving IMF funds. It is doing so even though the situations of the Asian countries are very different from that of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In addition, the IMF is applying its traditional mix of fiscal policies...and credit tightening...that were successful in Latin America" (22).
There is then an exploration of the SE Asian currency crisis:
"The Southeast Asian currency collapse that began in Thailand was an inevitable consequence of persistent large current account deficits and of the misguided attempt of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to maintain fixed exchange rates relative to the dollar" (22).
Thailand had a current account deficit that was quite large, and a currency pegged to the dollar. This meant that Thailand had to attract much foreign capital to service its debt. However, there were also pressures that kept investors coming back: the government ran a budget surplus, the population saved heavily. This was an untenable situation, especially with the baht tied to the dollar: when the yen fell relative to the dollar, Japanese investments in Thailand were discounted substantively. This caused a massive selling off of the baht. "At that point the IMF stepped in with a multibillion dollar rescue plan" (23).
This spread to the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, as all had fixed currencies and current account deficits.
The author believes that a similar role to the one played by the IMF in Latin America would have been appropriate, but that the Fund went well beyond that measure. The structural adjustment programs were extensive and excessively detailed.
"In deciding whether to insist on any particular reform, the IMF should ask three questions: Is this reform really needed to restore the country's access to international capital markets? Is this a technical matter that does not interfere unnecessarily with the proper jurisdiction of a sovereign government? If the policies to be changed are also practiced in the major industrial economies of Europe, would the IMF think it appropriate to force similar changes in those countries if they were subject to a fund program? (27).
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Ruigrok and van Tulder: The Logic of International Restructuring
Ruigrok, W, and R van Tulder. 1995. The Logic of International Restructuring. Routledge.
1: Introduction
"This book aims to shed light on the patterns by which large, primarily manufacturing, firms are trying to manage domestic and international restructuring, and on the type of 'solutions' produced by these patterns. We shall illustrate that many (best-practice) 'solutions' stem from a specific interest. This book tries to explore and assemble the building blocks of an alternative framework of analysis based on two assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that not just firms but a multitude of other actors as well are involved in restructuring processes...A second assumption in this book is that firms are not only seeking profits, but that they may also seek to influence the rules of the game of profit-making" (2).
There are three debates as highlighted by the authors: the first debate was over the nature of the restructuring of industry. The second issue explored throughout the 1980s explored technology through the lenses of globalization with an eye towards finance. The third debate explored different drivers of motivation for industrial production, either domestic or global.
The author notes that there is surprisingly little continuity, or attempts at continuity, between these three debates.
The concept of an "industrial complex" is introduced in order to facilitate better understanding of the potential linkages between the earlier debates. The contents of an industrial complex are the following: the core firm, the supplying firms, the dealers and distributors, the workers, the financiers, and the government (7-8).
2: The Elusive Concept of Post-Fordism
"Put simply, Fordism refers to the simultaneous growth of productivity and consumption. Fordism has two varieties: micro-Fordism, where such growth had been generated at the level of the firm, and macro-Fordism, where this simultaneous growth was realized at a societal level, also involving actors such as governments and national trade union federations" (12).
Definitions of post-Fordism are harder to concretize.
There is then an extensive overview of the ambiguous nature of post-Fordism and the need to provide something more concrete.
1: Introduction
"This book aims to shed light on the patterns by which large, primarily manufacturing, firms are trying to manage domestic and international restructuring, and on the type of 'solutions' produced by these patterns. We shall illustrate that many (best-practice) 'solutions' stem from a specific interest. This book tries to explore and assemble the building blocks of an alternative framework of analysis based on two assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that not just firms but a multitude of other actors as well are involved in restructuring processes...A second assumption in this book is that firms are not only seeking profits, but that they may also seek to influence the rules of the game of profit-making" (2).
There are three debates as highlighted by the authors: the first debate was over the nature of the restructuring of industry. The second issue explored throughout the 1980s explored technology through the lenses of globalization with an eye towards finance. The third debate explored different drivers of motivation for industrial production, either domestic or global.
The author notes that there is surprisingly little continuity, or attempts at continuity, between these three debates.
The concept of an "industrial complex" is introduced in order to facilitate better understanding of the potential linkages between the earlier debates. The contents of an industrial complex are the following: the core firm, the supplying firms, the dealers and distributors, the workers, the financiers, and the government (7-8).
2: The Elusive Concept of Post-Fordism
"Put simply, Fordism refers to the simultaneous growth of productivity and consumption. Fordism has two varieties: micro-Fordism, where such growth had been generated at the level of the firm, and macro-Fordism, where this simultaneous growth was realized at a societal level, also involving actors such as governments and national trade union federations" (12).
Definitions of post-Fordism are harder to concretize.
There is then an extensive overview of the ambiguous nature of post-Fordism and the need to provide something more concrete.
Boyer: The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited
Boyer, R, and CEPREMAP (Center). 1993. The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization But Still the Century of Nations? CEPREMAP.
The convergence argument seed domestic institutions and unique attributes being increasingly homogenized as the logic of capital dictates a certain kind of economic performance and institutional construction so as to maximize efficiency of production and transaction. However, Boyer argues that this strong hypothesis may miss the mark a bit, and that the end of the nation-state should not be glibly foretold. Instead, one should see this transition as a diverse process where different institutions matter.
"The argument proceeds along the following lines: First, ambiguities in the definition of convergence are spelled out by disentangling three distinct meanings: economic convergence, similarity in the style of development, and finally the characteristics of institutional settings that organize interactions between economy and polity. Second, when precise tests of the main macroeconomic variables are built, we see that no clear trend to convergence or divergence emerges. Third, even though the socialist bloc has collapsed, this has not reduced diversity. Rather it has revealed the coexistence and competition of various kinds of capitalism" (30).
"According to the first definition of convergence, the globalization of finance, labor, technologies, and products proceeds so that each nation comes to resemble a small-or medium-size firm in an ocean of pure and perfect competition. Consequently, any Keynesian-style intervention is bound to fail, given that the competition is now international and foreign producers will capture the domestic market if local producers do not adjust to the costs and prices achieved by competitors" (30).
"For many social scientist, convergence has another meaning: not pure economic performance, but the basic constitutional order, organizing interactions between polity and economy...Convergence in this sense is to be demonstrated by the collapse of authoritarian regimes and their replacement by more democratic constitutions" (31).
The third possibility is the most complex option, and involved mixed convergence: each economy is a combination of a wide variety of distinct factors that help to shape its output. If these institutions matched closely with the institutions of another economy and that economy was performing better, it would be possible to converge.
Boyer then explores empirical data on convergence of productivity since WWII. The author finds the evidence to be mixed and argues that results depend heavily on sample size and selection.
There is some evidence that things have converged in the late 20th century. However, this is not universal, and this evidence does not take into consideration that convergence typically occurs within a core set of countries that have already experienced a certain degree of industrialization and development.
"The 1990s and the next century, too, are likely to be still the epoch of nations. The complex set of contradictory forces that are pushing simultaneously toward convergence and divergence are far from moving toward a single best institutional design" (59).
The following chapter is also excellent, though I did not write an abstract:
Wade, R. 1996. Globalization and its limits: reports of the death of the national economy are greatly exaggerated. National Diversity and Global Capitalism: 60-88.
The convergence argument seed domestic institutions and unique attributes being increasingly homogenized as the logic of capital dictates a certain kind of economic performance and institutional construction so as to maximize efficiency of production and transaction. However, Boyer argues that this strong hypothesis may miss the mark a bit, and that the end of the nation-state should not be glibly foretold. Instead, one should see this transition as a diverse process where different institutions matter.
"The argument proceeds along the following lines: First, ambiguities in the definition of convergence are spelled out by disentangling three distinct meanings: economic convergence, similarity in the style of development, and finally the characteristics of institutional settings that organize interactions between economy and polity. Second, when precise tests of the main macroeconomic variables are built, we see that no clear trend to convergence or divergence emerges. Third, even though the socialist bloc has collapsed, this has not reduced diversity. Rather it has revealed the coexistence and competition of various kinds of capitalism" (30).
"According to the first definition of convergence, the globalization of finance, labor, technologies, and products proceeds so that each nation comes to resemble a small-or medium-size firm in an ocean of pure and perfect competition. Consequently, any Keynesian-style intervention is bound to fail, given that the competition is now international and foreign producers will capture the domestic market if local producers do not adjust to the costs and prices achieved by competitors" (30).
"For many social scientist, convergence has another meaning: not pure economic performance, but the basic constitutional order, organizing interactions between polity and economy...Convergence in this sense is to be demonstrated by the collapse of authoritarian regimes and their replacement by more democratic constitutions" (31).
The third possibility is the most complex option, and involved mixed convergence: each economy is a combination of a wide variety of distinct factors that help to shape its output. If these institutions matched closely with the institutions of another economy and that economy was performing better, it would be possible to converge.
Boyer then explores empirical data on convergence of productivity since WWII. The author finds the evidence to be mixed and argues that results depend heavily on sample size and selection.
There is some evidence that things have converged in the late 20th century. However, this is not universal, and this evidence does not take into consideration that convergence typically occurs within a core set of countries that have already experienced a certain degree of industrialization and development.
"The 1990s and the next century, too, are likely to be still the epoch of nations. The complex set of contradictory forces that are pushing simultaneously toward convergence and divergence are far from moving toward a single best institutional design" (59).
The following chapter is also excellent, though I did not write an abstract:
Wade, R. 1996. Globalization and its limits: reports of the death of the national economy are greatly exaggerated. National Diversity and Global Capitalism: 60-88.
Berger and Dore: National Diversity and Global Capitalism
Berger, S, and RP Dore. 1996. National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Cornell University Press.
Suzanne Berger: Introduction:
Do advanced economies converge on a set of practices or not? In the positive: "...competition, imitation, diffusion of best practice, trade and capital mobility naturally operate to produce convergence across nations in the structures of production and in the relations among economy, society, and state. Variations may be found from country to country, because of different historical legacies" (1).
Neoclassical economic theory would predict that convergence of factor prices would generally take hold in countries that were involved within the system of globalization, however, not all are in agreement. Some argue (Boyer) that it depends on what is being looked at when; at times one can see convergence, and at other times, convergence is a bit more difficult to notice.
"The fundamental cleavage cuts between one group of the authors who conclude (with varying degrees of enthusiasm or regret) that national diversities are likely to disappear; and on the other side, the authors who (with varying degrees of enthusiasm or regret) predict the long-term persistence of fundamentally different national models" (11).
"In sum, those who see convergence on the horizon of advanced countries have very different conceptions of how this process is likely to operate. Among the contributors to the volume, three distinct notions emerge: convergence as the triumph of market forces, abetted by complicit or passive governments; convergence as the result of diffusion of best practice and competition among institutional forms; and convergence as the internationally negotiated or coerced choice of one set of rules and institutions" (16).
"A second cluster of contributions in this volume sharply opposes the convergence perspective. The common theme here is the long-term resilience and expansion of diverse national systems and models of capitalism. The arguments against convergence laid out in these essays build on different analyses of how markets work, ideas about institutional coherence and adaptation, and alternative understandings of how politics shapes the economy" (19).
These views argue that the diversity of institutions is not necessarily a problem, that the ideal-type global market to which people should converge is just that: not a reality; and that domestic political considerations and push-backs should not be discounted.
"The conclusion that emerges from the essays in this volume is that the space for political vision and choice--and for a diversity of choices--is open and wide. The biggest question left unanswered is not whether politics can seize and use this space, but which politics and for whom?" (25).
Suzanne Berger: Introduction:
Do advanced economies converge on a set of practices or not? In the positive: "...competition, imitation, diffusion of best practice, trade and capital mobility naturally operate to produce convergence across nations in the structures of production and in the relations among economy, society, and state. Variations may be found from country to country, because of different historical legacies" (1).
Neoclassical economic theory would predict that convergence of factor prices would generally take hold in countries that were involved within the system of globalization, however, not all are in agreement. Some argue (Boyer) that it depends on what is being looked at when; at times one can see convergence, and at other times, convergence is a bit more difficult to notice.
"The fundamental cleavage cuts between one group of the authors who conclude (with varying degrees of enthusiasm or regret) that national diversities are likely to disappear; and on the other side, the authors who (with varying degrees of enthusiasm or regret) predict the long-term persistence of fundamentally different national models" (11).
"In sum, those who see convergence on the horizon of advanced countries have very different conceptions of how this process is likely to operate. Among the contributors to the volume, three distinct notions emerge: convergence as the triumph of market forces, abetted by complicit or passive governments; convergence as the result of diffusion of best practice and competition among institutional forms; and convergence as the internationally negotiated or coerced choice of one set of rules and institutions" (16).
"A second cluster of contributions in this volume sharply opposes the convergence perspective. The common theme here is the long-term resilience and expansion of diverse national systems and models of capitalism. The arguments against convergence laid out in these essays build on different analyses of how markets work, ideas about institutional coherence and adaptation, and alternative understandings of how politics shapes the economy" (19).
These views argue that the diversity of institutions is not necessarily a problem, that the ideal-type global market to which people should converge is just that: not a reality; and that domestic political considerations and push-backs should not be discounted.
"The conclusion that emerges from the essays in this volume is that the space for political vision and choice--and for a diversity of choices--is open and wide. The biggest question left unanswered is not whether politics can seize and use this space, but which politics and for whom?" (25).
Obstfeld and Rogoff: The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics
OBSTFELD, M, and K ROGOFF. 2000. The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause? NBER Working Paper.
"Why do people seem to have such a strong preference for consumption of their home goods (the home bias in trade puzzle)? Why do observed OECD current account imbalances tend to be so small relative to saving and investment when measured over any sustained period (the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle)? Why do home investors overwhelmingly prefer to hold home equity assets (the home bias portfolio puzzle)? Why is consumption less correlated than output across major OECT countries (the consumption correlations puzzle)? How is it possible that the half-life of real exchange rate changes can be three to four years (the purchasing power parity puzzle)? Why are exchange rates so volatile and so apparently disconnected from fundamentals (the exchange rate disconnect puzzle...)?" (2).
The authors attempt to explain all of these puzzles through the lenses of costs to trade conferred by distance in transport, a key assumption of the gravity trade model.
Each of the puzzles are explored separately. I skimmed them and will not document them.
"An obvious potential criticism of our central theme is that transport technology has been steadily improving over the past half century, and tariffs have fallen dramatically, especially among the OECD countries...while transport technology has steadily improved, labor costs have risen sharply so there is actually some debate about whether net transport costs have fallen" (43).
"Why do people seem to have such a strong preference for consumption of their home goods (the home bias in trade puzzle)? Why do observed OECD current account imbalances tend to be so small relative to saving and investment when measured over any sustained period (the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle)? Why do home investors overwhelmingly prefer to hold home equity assets (the home bias portfolio puzzle)? Why is consumption less correlated than output across major OECT countries (the consumption correlations puzzle)? How is it possible that the half-life of real exchange rate changes can be three to four years (the purchasing power parity puzzle)? Why are exchange rates so volatile and so apparently disconnected from fundamentals (the exchange rate disconnect puzzle...)?" (2).
The authors attempt to explain all of these puzzles through the lenses of costs to trade conferred by distance in transport, a key assumption of the gravity trade model.
Each of the puzzles are explored separately. I skimmed them and will not document them.
"An obvious potential criticism of our central theme is that transport technology has been steadily improving over the past half century, and tariffs have fallen dramatically, especially among the OECD countries...while transport technology has steadily improved, labor costs have risen sharply so there is actually some debate about whether net transport costs have fallen" (43).
Das: Trade and Global Integration
Das, Dilip. Trade and Global Integration. CSGR Working Paper No. 120/30.
"This paper focuses on the post-war process of creation of a global trading system and integration of world trade. As the former came into being, multilateral trade liberalization became an on-going feature of the global economy facilitating international trade, consequently importance of international trade in the global economy increased dramatically...Although the industrial economies were the primary beneficiaries of the multilateral trade liberalization in the past, for the developing economies trade, particularly trade in manufacturing goods, went on increasingly monotonically. The kaleidoscope of global trading system turned several times and international trade has enormously expanded over the preceding half century, which in turn contributed substantially to global integration through trade, albeit in a selective manner" (2).
This paper has two distinct foci: firstly, it is concerned with exploring how a global trading regime with liberal characteristics developed over time. Secondly, it is interested in the different shape that this global trade regime took as it evolved: how has the structure of international trade shifted over time?
The International Trade Organization was formed shortly after WWII, with the goal of merging with the other two Bretton Woods organizations to help orchestrate international economic interaction. The ITO fell short (US congress hesitation and fear of loss of control), and thus the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was instituted instead. This was instituted in 1948. The Uruguay Round (1986-94) helped create the World Trade Organization, which incorporated the GATT along with other more specialized international agreements (on agriculture, textiles, etc.).
"Like the United Nations and the World Bank, [the WTO] became a key institution of global governance. Its essential functions are: (i) administering WTO trade agreements, (ii) providing a forum for multilateral trade negotiations, (iii) handling trade disputes between members, (iv) monitoring national trade policies, (v) providing technical assistance and training for developing countries, and (vi) handling economic co-operation with other international organizations" (7).
"Four trends can be clearly identified in the global trading system during the preceding half century: (i) highly uneven pace of liberalization of markets in goods and services in both developing and industrial economies, (ii) increasing differentiation in treatment for different levels of developing economies by the global trading system, (iii) a growing number of regional trading agreements...among both developing and industrial economies, and (iv) expanding scope and strength of[regional trade agreements]" (10).
"Measured in constant...dollars, the ratio of global trade in goods and services to global GDP increased from 8 percent in 1950 to 29.5% in 2000" (10).
Economic growth occurs because of trade liberalization for the following: "Essentially there are there sources of economic growth, namely, growth in inputs, improvement in efficiency of resource allocation and innovation" (11).
The author explores empirical claims that there is little evidence of globalization in trade. This is accomplished using the gravity model of trade. However, the proxy used within that model to measure the ease of trade between different parties is physical proximity. Globalization trends have imposed technologies that increasingly make those proximate relationships less impacting, and thus the gravity model is brought into question.
"This paper focuses on the post-war process of creation of a global trading system and integration of world trade. As the former came into being, multilateral trade liberalization became an on-going feature of the global economy facilitating international trade, consequently importance of international trade in the global economy increased dramatically...Although the industrial economies were the primary beneficiaries of the multilateral trade liberalization in the past, for the developing economies trade, particularly trade in manufacturing goods, went on increasingly monotonically. The kaleidoscope of global trading system turned several times and international trade has enormously expanded over the preceding half century, which in turn contributed substantially to global integration through trade, albeit in a selective manner" (2).
This paper has two distinct foci: firstly, it is concerned with exploring how a global trading regime with liberal characteristics developed over time. Secondly, it is interested in the different shape that this global trade regime took as it evolved: how has the structure of international trade shifted over time?
The International Trade Organization was formed shortly after WWII, with the goal of merging with the other two Bretton Woods organizations to help orchestrate international economic interaction. The ITO fell short (US congress hesitation and fear of loss of control), and thus the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was instituted instead. This was instituted in 1948. The Uruguay Round (1986-94) helped create the World Trade Organization, which incorporated the GATT along with other more specialized international agreements (on agriculture, textiles, etc.).
"Like the United Nations and the World Bank, [the WTO] became a key institution of global governance. Its essential functions are: (i) administering WTO trade agreements, (ii) providing a forum for multilateral trade negotiations, (iii) handling trade disputes between members, (iv) monitoring national trade policies, (v) providing technical assistance and training for developing countries, and (vi) handling economic co-operation with other international organizations" (7).
"Four trends can be clearly identified in the global trading system during the preceding half century: (i) highly uneven pace of liberalization of markets in goods and services in both developing and industrial economies, (ii) increasing differentiation in treatment for different levels of developing economies by the global trading system, (iii) a growing number of regional trading agreements...among both developing and industrial economies, and (iv) expanding scope and strength of[regional trade agreements]" (10).
"Measured in constant...dollars, the ratio of global trade in goods and services to global GDP increased from 8 percent in 1950 to 29.5% in 2000" (10).
Economic growth occurs because of trade liberalization for the following: "Essentially there are there sources of economic growth, namely, growth in inputs, improvement in efficiency of resource allocation and innovation" (11).
The author explores empirical claims that there is little evidence of globalization in trade. This is accomplished using the gravity model of trade. However, the proxy used within that model to measure the ease of trade between different parties is physical proximity. Globalization trends have imposed technologies that increasingly make those proximate relationships less impacting, and thus the gravity model is brought into question.
Monday, January 26, 2009
SMART 2020: Enabling the Low Carbon Economy in the Information Age
The Climate Group on Behalf of the Global eSustainability Initiative (GeSI). 2008. Smart 2020: Enabling the Low Carbon Economy in the Information Age.
This report was compiled by the ICT industry. GeSI is an industry organization that attempts to promote sustainable development through the adoption of ICT technology. This report begins by noting that there are wide ranging goals to reduce carbon emissions to their 1990 levels by 2020. This can be partially accomplished through the further adoption of ICT technologies. This report attempts to show how ICT can be used to accomplish these goals.
"The ICT sector's own emissions are expected to increase, in a business as usual (BAU) scenario, from 0.53 billion tonnes (Gt) carbon dioxide equivalent...in 2002 to 1.43 [billion tonnes] by 2020. But specific ICT opportunities identified in this report can lead to emission reductions five times the size of the sector's own footprint, up to 7.8 [billion tonnes], or 15% of total BAU emissions by 2020" (6).
"Aside from emissions associated with deforestation, the largest contribution to man-made GHG emissions comes from power generation and fuel used for transportation. It is therefore not surprising that the biggest role ICTs could play is in helping to improve energy efficiency in power transmission and distribution...in buildings and factories that demand power and in the use of transportation to deliver goods" (9).
These ICT based savings on carbon emissions, not to mention efficiency improvements and thus other savings, can be achieved most readily in a few, key areas, as identified by this report: Smart Motor Systems; Smart Logistics; Smart Buildings; Smart Grids (9).
Their report draws on IPCC conclusions about the effects of carbon emissions and climate change.
The report makes a claim that, by 2020, ICT will provide for 5 times the reduction in carbon emissions than its own footprint. This is achieved through the following: standardization of energy consumption and emissions; monitoring energy use; accounting improvements relative to energy consumption and emissions; a rethinking in the way that people work, live and play; as well as a transformation through integrating systems (ch 1 pg 15).
ICT represents about 2% of global carbon emissions. "In 2007, the total footprint of the ICIT sector--including personal computers...and peripherals, telecoms networks and devices and data centres--was 830 [metric tons of carbon dioxide], about 2% of the estimated total emissions from human activity released that year. Even if the efficient technology developments outlined in the rest of the chapter are implemented, this figure looks set to grow at 6% each year until 2020"
(ch 2 pg 17).
The relative footprints of personal computers, data centers and telecoms are explored out to 2020.
ICT can help by increasing the efficiency of a variety of sectors within the global economy, from smart grids to improved efficiencies in industrial production. "ICT can make a major contribution to the global response to climate change. It could deliver up to a 15% reduction of BAU emissions in 2020.k..representing a value of [553 billion Euros] in energy and fuel saved and an additional [91 billion Euros] in carbon saved assuming a cost of carbon of [20 Euros/tonne] for a total of [644 billion Euros] savings" (ch 3 pg 51).
The assumptions out to 2020 are the following: elimination of all CDs and DVDs; 3% reduction in emissions from shopping transport; 25% reduction in global paper use; 30% reduction in business air travel for video conferencing; work related travel in urban areas decreased 80%; non work related travel down by 20%; 15% reduction in residential building emissions; 60% decrease in office emissions applied to 80% of office buildings; 30% increase in industrial motor systems; 15% decrease in electricity consumption; 14% reduction in road transport; 24% reduction in inventory; 5% reduction in carbon emissions from lack of congestion; 12% reduction based on improved driving style; 1% reduction in fuel consumption; 32% reduction in ground fuel consumption; 3% reduction in flight time; 2.5% reduction in rail transport b/c of better scheduling; 4% reduction in shipping transport b/c better use of ships; 3% increase in ship performance; 5% reduction in packaging material; 40% reduction in retail buildings; 25% reduction in retail and warehouse space; 13% reduction in HVAC consumption; 16% reduction in lighting; 30% reduction of T&D losses for developed countries and 38% for developing; 5% reduction in energy consumption; 10% reduction in carbon intensity of generation of developed countries; 5% reduction in carbon intensity of generation of developing countries (Appendix 3 pg 66-70).
This report was compiled by the ICT industry. GeSI is an industry organization that attempts to promote sustainable development through the adoption of ICT technology. This report begins by noting that there are wide ranging goals to reduce carbon emissions to their 1990 levels by 2020. This can be partially accomplished through the further adoption of ICT technologies. This report attempts to show how ICT can be used to accomplish these goals.
"The ICT sector's own emissions are expected to increase, in a business as usual (BAU) scenario, from 0.53 billion tonnes (Gt) carbon dioxide equivalent...in 2002 to 1.43 [billion tonnes] by 2020. But specific ICT opportunities identified in this report can lead to emission reductions five times the size of the sector's own footprint, up to 7.8 [billion tonnes], or 15% of total BAU emissions by 2020" (6).
"Aside from emissions associated with deforestation, the largest contribution to man-made GHG emissions comes from power generation and fuel used for transportation. It is therefore not surprising that the biggest role ICTs could play is in helping to improve energy efficiency in power transmission and distribution...in buildings and factories that demand power and in the use of transportation to deliver goods" (9).
These ICT based savings on carbon emissions, not to mention efficiency improvements and thus other savings, can be achieved most readily in a few, key areas, as identified by this report: Smart Motor Systems; Smart Logistics; Smart Buildings; Smart Grids (9).
Their report draws on IPCC conclusions about the effects of carbon emissions and climate change.
The report makes a claim that, by 2020, ICT will provide for 5 times the reduction in carbon emissions than its own footprint. This is achieved through the following: standardization of energy consumption and emissions; monitoring energy use; accounting improvements relative to energy consumption and emissions; a rethinking in the way that people work, live and play; as well as a transformation through integrating systems (ch 1 pg 15).
ICT represents about 2% of global carbon emissions. "In 2007, the total footprint of the ICIT sector--including personal computers...and peripherals, telecoms networks and devices and data centres--was 830 [metric tons of carbon dioxide], about 2% of the estimated total emissions from human activity released that year. Even if the efficient technology developments outlined in the rest of the chapter are implemented, this figure looks set to grow at 6% each year until 2020"
(ch 2 pg 17).
The relative footprints of personal computers, data centers and telecoms are explored out to 2020.
ICT can help by increasing the efficiency of a variety of sectors within the global economy, from smart grids to improved efficiencies in industrial production. "ICT can make a major contribution to the global response to climate change. It could deliver up to a 15% reduction of BAU emissions in 2020.k..representing a value of [553 billion Euros] in energy and fuel saved and an additional [91 billion Euros] in carbon saved assuming a cost of carbon of [20 Euros/tonne] for a total of [644 billion Euros] savings" (ch 3 pg 51).
The assumptions out to 2020 are the following: elimination of all CDs and DVDs; 3% reduction in emissions from shopping transport; 25% reduction in global paper use; 30% reduction in business air travel for video conferencing; work related travel in urban areas decreased 80%; non work related travel down by 20%; 15% reduction in residential building emissions; 60% decrease in office emissions applied to 80% of office buildings; 30% increase in industrial motor systems; 15% decrease in electricity consumption; 14% reduction in road transport; 24% reduction in inventory; 5% reduction in carbon emissions from lack of congestion; 12% reduction based on improved driving style; 1% reduction in fuel consumption; 32% reduction in ground fuel consumption; 3% reduction in flight time; 2.5% reduction in rail transport b/c of better scheduling; 4% reduction in shipping transport b/c better use of ships; 3% increase in ship performance; 5% reduction in packaging material; 40% reduction in retail buildings; 25% reduction in retail and warehouse space; 13% reduction in HVAC consumption; 16% reduction in lighting; 30% reduction of T&D losses for developed countries and 38% for developing; 5% reduction in energy consumption; 10% reduction in carbon intensity of generation of developed countries; 5% reduction in carbon intensity of generation of developing countries (Appendix 3 pg 66-70).
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