Knorr: The War Potential of Nations

Knorr, Klaus Eugen. The War Potential of Nations. Greenwood Press Reprint, 1978.

 “This book is meant to contribute to a theory of war potential.  The term ‘war potential’ is used frequently in literature, press, lectures, and classroom discussion, yet its meaning is usually hazy and the literature to which the student might turn for consultation is inadequate” (vii).  The book is interested in economic, industrial, and morale components of war potential.

“Military means is one of the instruments through which nations attempt to settle international conflicts of interest.  Since the instrument is used to influence the behavior of other nations, military power is necessarily relative to that of other nations…Military power is subject to change for two reasons.  A nation’s power may rise or fall because there are changes in the power constituents of other nations or because there is a change in its own means of waging war” (19). 

“Short of battle, there is no precise test or measurement of mobilized military power” (28).

“In this sense, ‘war potential’ is simply a collective term for all the relevant elements of military strength other than the armed forces themselves” (40).

“For example, the following list of components have been drawn up by five different authors:”  (40):

This is Nicholas Spykman in America’s Strategy in World Politics: 

“(1) Size of territory; nature of frontiers; size of population; absence or presence of raw materials; economic and technological development; financial strength’ ethnic homogeneity’ effective social integration’ political stability’ and national spirit.” (40) 

This is Morgenthau in In Defense of the National Interest:

“(2) Geography; natural resources; industrial capacity; military preparedness; population; national character; national morale; quality of diplomacy.” (41) 

This is Gulick in Administrative Reflections from World War II:

“(3) Manpower; raw materials; capital investments; science, technology, and research; organizations and institutions (including government and economic and social institutions).” (41) 

This is Steinmetz:

“(4) Population (size and structure); size of territory; wealth; political institutions; leadership; national unity and cohesion; respect and friends abroad; moral qualities.” (41)

This is Fischer:

“ (5) Political factors:  geographical position; size of state and number and density of population; organizational skill and cultural level; kinds of frontiers and attitudes of neighboring countries.  Psychological factors:  economic flexibility and inventive skill; perseverance and adaptability of the population.  Economic factors:  fertility of soil and mineral wealth; industrial organization and stage of technology; development of commerce and transportation; and financial strength” (41).

This list is debilitating.  So the author makes three broad categories:  economic capacity, institutional acumen, and war motivation.

“If it is hard to measure and compare the ready striking power of nations, it is still harder to measure and compare their war potential and hence their total military power, of which potential is a major, and at most time the predominant, part…How can we measure administrative competence, motivation for war, and economic capacity?  How can the various components of these aggregates be measured?  Even if we could measure the three broad constituents of potential, how can we measure and compare the total war potential so long as our units of measurement are incommensurable?” (47).

Alcock and Newcombe:  The Perception of National Power

Alcock, Norman Z., and Alan G. Newcombe. “The Perception of National Power.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 14, no. 3 (September 1, 1970): 335–343.

"...if international relations is to become a science it will have to establish a definitive quantitative measure for its most basic variable--national power" (335).

"There may be differences between 'real' power and 'perceived' power.  Given some objective level of 'real' power, a nation may nevertheless be perceived as stronger, or weaker, y the people of another nation.  Yet both objective and subjective power must ber based on a number of measurable facts.  The purpose of this empirical study is to ascertain these measurable facts and thus help to establish a quantitative definition of national power.  In addition to its theoretical value, a quantitative measurement of power can have an immediate practical application for peace--that is, in devising formulas for weighted voting in the United Nations, which is now floundering on the 'one nation, one vote' principle" (335).  

They survey folks asking them to rank countries by "importance".  This is the dependent variable for their analysis.  

"We conclude, therefore, that perceived national power is some function of GNP or military expenditure (in purchasing-power-equivalent dollars) if none of the nations has been at war recently, but is a function of military expenditure alone if warring nations are included in the rating"  (342).

Two regressions that are salient:  Relative Power = -8.85 + 0.67 population + 0.47 GNP/cap

Relative power = 9.4 - 0.09 population + 0.93 GNP

Kugler and Arbetman:  Choosing Among Measures of Power

Kugler, Jacek, and Marina Arbetman. “Choosing Among Measures of Power:  A Review of the Empirical Record.” In Power in World Politics, edited by Richard J Stoll and Michael Don Ward. Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner Publishers, 1989.

"We show that, for major powers, a number of indicators used in international politics to index power are highly related.  Whether one chooses to use GNP, the COW Indexes, or adjust these for military expenditures is not critically relevant for the analysis of relations among major powers over time.  This choice affects cross-sectional analysis since rank varies at one point in time but even here the average disparity is on the order of 10%" (73-4).

Merritt and Zinnes:  Alternative Indexes of National Power

Merritt, Richard L, and Dina A Zinnes. “Alternative Indexes of National Power.” In Power in world politics, edited by Richard J Stoll and Michael Don Ward. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1989.

"Our task is threefold   first, to summarize the more prominent indexes of power that researches have proposed, highlighting both similarities and differences; second, to compare the empirical consequences of these alternative approaches; and third, to explore the implications of these findings" (12).  They define power in line with what others have said, "...how probable it is that X can exert d amount of influence over Y with respect to issue g" (12).

Referring to single variable models of power:  "A high national income...can imply a country's long-term ability to influence others, but not if it means that the population is less willing and even less able than others to engage in activities such as wars that might jeopardize its high standard of living.  A healthy, skilled population may be a capability; an equally large but disease ridden and illiterate population can diminish the government's capacities.  General s never tire of telling us that even the best-equipped army is ineffective without good leadership and high morale.  Is energy used to drive television sets and compact-disk players equivalent to energy used for industrial production?  Without strong evidence that a single-variable indicator predicts..relevant outcomes,k it is difficult to answer the complaints of 'realists' who point to a more complex world than any single indicator suggests" (14).

They list various contributions to measurements of power:

Knorr:  very early, measured potential military power

Alcock and Newcombe:  interested in perceptions, used Russet 1968 (in Singer Quantitative International Politics).  Find three equations that can be used to assess relative power.  The two they like are:

Relative Power = -8.85 + 0.67 population + 0.47 GNP/cap
Relative power = 9.4 - 0.09 population + 0.93 GNP

Singer:  COW.

Demographics:  Total population and urban population
Industrial:  energy consumption and iron and steel production
Military:  total spending and size of military

Fucks:  non linear formulas that combine population, energy, and steel.  In German.  "Fucks predicts that growth in US power will taper off and reach 200 [base 100 US in 1960] by 2040.  Meanwhile, China's power will outstrip that of the United States in about 1975 and reach a score of approximately 3000 in the year 2040" (17).

Cline:  measures "capabilities" (population, territory, income, resource production, military capabilities) as well as "commitment" (national strategy, national will).

German:  non-linear, and influenced by possession of nuclear weapons.

Lemke:  Regions of War and Peace

Lemke, Douglas. Regions of war and peace. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

The book begins with an overview of power transition theory juxtaposed with balance of power theory.  "The critically important variables associated with war and peace within power transition theory are thus relative power relations and status quo evaluations" (25).

Lemke then applies the logic of power transition theory to regional levels.  He deploys a "multiple hierarchy model" which argues that a regional "status quo" and dominant power is common, and that global powers do not frequently interfere with these regional dynamics (Vietnam and Korea are exceptions).  "In spite of the fact that these authors variously use the terms lesser-, subordinate-, "inferiour"-, local-, or regional balances, they all seem to be suggesting the same thing; namely, the international balance or international system is a set of international systems arranged geographically, or in positions of relative inferiority/superiority, or both" (58).

He uses both COW CINC measures and GDP/GNP to measure relative power.  The threshold for parity is 70 percent of the power of the dominant.  He outlines regional groupings and and regional powers.  Does much more than I describe here.