Schmitt: Political Theology

Schmitt, C. (2005). Political theology : four chapters on the concept of sovereignty. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (5).

The footnote to the above quote highlights the context in which “the exception” is decided upon. It is specifically economic and political situations in which the application of “extraordinary measures” takes place. The sovereign is one who is not constrained by legal structures or mores. This is no Kantian leader.

“...every legal order is based on a decision, and also the concept of the legal order, which is applied as something self-evident, contains within it the contrast of the two distinct elements of the juristic—norm and decision. Like every other order, the legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm” (10). The norm is what creates the milieu in which the law can be achieved, but it takes a decision to institute that law. Decisions are what move history.

In reference to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution: “This provision corresponds to the development and practice of the liberal constitutional state, which attempts to repress the question of sovereignty by a division and mutual control of competences” (11).

“The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception. In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition” (15).

Politics as Old Theology: “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development—in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts” (36).

Carr: What is History?

Carr, E. H. (1961). What is history? London, New York, Macmillan; St. Martin's Press.

Carr writes about epistemology, about what we know and how we know what we know. He begins his book by exploring the relationship between the historian, fact and knowledge. “A fact is like a sack—it won’t stand up till you’ve put something in it” (9).

A historical fact is one that has been given a life of its own by society, academia and a combination of contingent and determinant forces that bring it to the forefront of all other facts. On pages 10-1, Carr takes great care to examine a fact that may or may not be turned into a historical fact. The fact was the murder of a gingerbread baker by a mob, and this fact stood simply as that, a fact of history, but not yet a historic fact, until Dr. Kitson Clark came around and cited it. This, in Carr’s estimation, does not mean that it is destined to be a historical fact, but rather that it now has more potential to be a historical fact than it had previous to this citation. Historic fact, however, does not make history, but it is rather made by the subjective judgment of individuals.

Carr then looks at the relationship between the individual and society and claims that it is impossible to know which came first, which was a driver of the creation of the other. He goes on to talk about how the individual and society constantly play off one another, and concludes by mentioning Hegel’s Hero.

The view which I would hope to discourage is the view which places great men outside history and sees them as imposing themselves on history in virtue of their greatness…” (67). Carr then goes on to lovingly quote Hegel’s definition of his Hero’s interaction with his society. In Hegel’s formulation, the Hero “can put into words the will of his age… he can actualize his age (68).

In other words, Carr’s view of history fits nicely with Hegel’s Hero: the “Great Men” of history do not materialize out of thin air, free from determinant conditions and then impose their will on everyone around them. Instead, the Hero interacting with and taking cues from society produces history.

He then moves on to examining history, science and morality. History, in Carr’s estimation, is clearly distinct from other forms of science, specifically the “hard” sciences. One reason for this qualitatively distinct character is the nature of the object to the subject, or the scientist to the subject. While Carr casts doubt on the pure objectivity of even the “hard” sciences, he is much more clear that history is clearly very subjective.

He then goes on to examine values in writing about history, and how the historian must stand at a distance from their subject and not condone or disapprove of personal decisions. The historian’s job is to write about what happened, not tell people why it was wrong or right.

“The serious historian is the one who recognizes the historically conditioned character of all values, not the one who claims for his own values an objectivity beyond history. The beliefs which we hold and the standards of judgment which we set up are part of history, and are as much subject to historical investigation as any other aspect of human behaviour. Few sciences today-least of all, the social sciences-would lay claim to total independence. But history has no fundamental dependence on something outside itself which would differentiate it from any other science” (109).

Carr then moves on to look at causation in history. He looks at, what he calls, two “red-herrings” in history: Determinism in History, and Chance in History.

Carr’s definition of determinism (121) focuses on understanding the causes of effects, and being able to point to an effect and clearly identify the cause as the only way that this fact could have come about. He takes time to parry with those who would focus on Marx and Hegel’s potentially deterministic aspect of their approach to understanding history. He paints these critics as being overly simplistic, and arguing that, because contingency does seem to exist, determinant action can not. He seems to conclude this argument by claiming that, “the fact is that all human actions are both free and determined,” and thus, understanding the causes requires a nuanced approach (124).

He then goes on to look at the causes of the death of an individual. This person, Robinson, went out for cigarettes and was hit by a car. Carr wonders what the real cause of the death was.

Rational causes are causes that can be understood and applied for a purpose, or, read, for a value judgment. If we thought that we could learn something by the fact that Robinson was a smoker and he died going out to buy cigarettes, that would be a rational cause. Since it falls to the realm of chance, we say that it is accidental. Carr is not saying that rational causes are not bound up with value judgments, but simply that our value judgments make some causes rational, and some accidental.

Carr then moves on to look at history as progress. “History is progress through the transmission of acquired skills from one generation to another” (151). Progress does not have a finite beginning or end. Thirdly, progress does not progress linearly.

Then, there is the problemetization of objectivity: in the writing of history, it is akin to claiming that you have more successfully written a history that mirrors the accepted values of the society in which you live. Carr then moves onto the claim that brings the book together: one must understand the past, present and future to understand history. “History acquires meaning and objectivity only when it establishes a coherent relation between past and future” (173).

Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals

Kant, I. and H. S. Reiss (1991). Kant : political writings. Cambridge [England] ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Kant begins by exploring what constitutes a “Right”. It firstly applies to the relation between one person and another. Secondly, it concerns the will of both people in this relationship. Thirdly, the end that each will intends to achieve is explored. “Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right” (133). The Universal Law of Right: “let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (133).

This Right involves and legitimizes the use of coercion. Anyone who attempts to subvert this freedom can be coerced into conforming with the freedom. The governing authority is there to make sure that people conform to the freedom in question.

The State then fulfills an important role as the guarantor of the freedom that everyone has come to enjoy, and this involves the use of force and coercion to make sure that everyone remains free. “Experience teaches us the maxim that human beings act in a violent and malevolent manner, and that they tend to fight among themselves until an external coercive legislation supervenes” (137). This is because men will act independently, without a duty to anyone but themselves.

Citizens have three basic rights in this construction of the state and the individual: firstly, they have the freedom to obey only the laws of their own state and no other; secondly, they have civil equality in recognizing no one as being superior to themselves; and thirdly, they have civil independence to owe their freedom to no one other than everyone in the commonwealth. People who have a stake in the system should be given the right to vote and influence this commonwealth. Those who are not capable of such an important intervention should not be given this right (apprentices, servants, minors, women, etc.)

“This dependence upon the will of others and consequent inequality does not, however, in any way conflict with the freedom and equality of all men as human beings who together constitute a people. On the contrary, it is only by accepting these conditions that such a people can become a state and enter into a civil constitution…For from the fact that as passive members of the state, they can demand to be treated by all others in accordance with laws of natural freedom and equality, it does not follow that they also have a right to influence or organize the state itself as active members, or to cooperate in introducing particular laws. Instead, it only means that the positive laws to which the voters agree, of whatever sort they may be, must not be at variance with the natural laws of freedom and with the corresponding equality of all members of the people whereby they are allowed to work their way up from their passive condition to an active one” (140).

People in the State of Nature have an unbridled freedom, a freedom to do and act in any way that they see fit. However, Kant believes that this freedom is not accompanied with duty, and thus that people in nature only act in their self interest. He has a similar view to State of Nature issues as does Hobbes. Kant believes that people, “give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once as members of a commonwealth” (140). The State of Nature freedom is basically swapped for a freedom in a commonwealth, which is an, “entire and unfinished freedom” (140).

The ruler is the sovereign, and that person is the director of the government. However, while they make the ultimate decision, they are still bound by the law. This leader can not themselves pass judgement, they are not a tyrant, but they can appoint judges to do this for them.

“There can be no rightful resistance on the part of the people to the legislative head of state” (144). “The reason why it is the duty of the people to tolerate even what is apparently the most intolerable misuse of supreme power is that it is impossible ever to conceive of their resistance to the supreme legislation as being anything other than unlawful and liable to nullify the entire legal constitution. For before such resistance could be authorized, there would have to be a public law which permitted the people to offer resistance.” (144-5) The people may, however, refuse to participate in the political process and thus negatively resist.

Then, Kant moves on to talk about an International Right and eventually a Cosmopolitan Right. This will not be looked at in this summary, though it will be noted that it does represent an interesting example of how history moves from a pre-Hegelian perspective: There are ruptures in order (in almost a post-structural sense), and this brings about new orders, or, in Kant’s terms, Rights.

Kant: The Contest of Faculties

Kant, I. and H. S. Reiss (1991). Kant : political writings. Cambridge [England] ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Kant begins by making a distinction between the higher faculties, i.e. Theology, Law and Medicine with the lower faculties, i.e. Philosophy.

He then goes on to make one of his most important interventions: bridging the rationalist and the empiricist divide that had haunted philosophical debates for years (think Hume/Descarte). He does this by asking if the human race is continually improving and beginning to think about where he should go about finding such information. He claims that it is not possible to have simple, a priori history, for that would require a profit (177)

Kant then goes on to posit that there are three possibilities for the development of society: that we are regressing, progressing or standing still. He concludes that we are not regressing, that we are not progressing, and that if we are standing still, it would be a farce.

He claims that the problem of progress can not be fully explained through experience, but that we do have to start from the empirical position. Kant begins to search for an event that would show the emancipation of the human, the individual. “We are here concerned only with the attitude of the onlookers as it reveals itself in public while the drama of great political changes is taking place: for they openly express universal yet disinterested sympathy for one set of protagonists against their adversaries, even at the risk that their partiality could be of great disadvantage to themselves. Their reactions (because of its universality) proves that mankind as a whole shares a certain character in common, and it also proves (because of its disinterestedness) that man has a moral character, or at least the makings of one” (182).

This morality is comprised of two distinct elements: the, “right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit, without interference from other powers,” and, “once it is accepted that the only intrinsically rightful and morally good constitution which a people can have is by its very nature disposed to avoid wars of aggression…there is the aim, which is also a duty, of submitting to those conditio0ns by which war, the source of all evils and moral corruption, can be prevented” (182).

A legal framework that is derived from a constitution is what shall protect humans, and this will produce, “an increasing number of actions governed by duty” (187). How can this be achieved? By working from the top down: education is the key to making people more dutiful, and the authority of the state can provide this.

Badiou: Ethics

Badiou, Alain. (2001). Ethics : an essay on the understanding of evil. London ; New York: Verso.

Ethics are everywhere in modern society. Nearly every profession has an ethic that their professionals must uphold. Institutions, be them small county legislative boards or international and monstrous, like the IMF, have codes of conduct. “With respect to today’s socially inflated recourse to ethics, the purpose of this essay is twofold:”

“-To begin with, I will examine the precise nature of this phenomenon, which is the major ‘philosophical’ tendency of the day, as much in public opinion as for official institutions. I will try to establish that in reality it amounts to a genuine nihilism, a threatening denial of thought as such.

-I will then argue against this meaning of the term ‘ethics’, and propose a very different one. Rather than link the word to abstract categories (Man or Human, Right or Law, the Other…), it should be referred back to particular situations. Rather than reduce it to an aspect of pity for victims, it should become the enduring maxim of singular processes. Rather than make of it merely the province of conservatism with a good conscience, it should concern the destiny of truths, in the plural (3)”

The structure of the book proceeds from the subject (Does Man Exist?) to the object (Does the Other Exist?). It then explains how our current discourse of ethics edges towards nihilism (Ethics as a Figure of Nihilism). The final two chapters represent an argument for a different construction of ethics (The Ethic of Truths) and the sorting out of one of the problems with this argument (The Problem of Evil).

In the section that deals with the subject, Badiou begins by examining three thinkers who rejected the universal in favor of the particular. Foucault, Althusser and Lacan are all highlighted as people who looked towards the construction of language, towards processes, and contingency for their clues as to the formulation of theory. Badiou is clear that these thinkers are not indifferent to suffering, as some would claim because of their lack of focus on objectivity. No, “the truth is exactly the opposite: all were—each in his own way, and far more than those who uphold the cause of ‘ethics’ and ‘human rights’ today—the attentive and courageous militants of a cause” (6).

The current, modern construction of ethical is then examined. It is understood to be a priori, negative determinations of evil. He then highlights some of the themes of this project of ethics: a general human subject is posited, politics is subordinate to ethics, Evil is that from which Good is derived and that ‘Human Rights’ are rights to non-Evil (9).

This ethic has become unethical. It is characterized by universal self-interest, a lack of (truly) emancipatory politics and competition. It calls into question what man is, or whether s/he exists. This ethical project identifies people as victims. It reduces man to the level of an animal. It identifies man as the source of evil. It prevents itself from thinking singularly through its negative determination of Evil.

This is not the way to be faithful to ethics or to a situation. To be faithful means, “to treat it right to the limit of possibility. Or, if you prefer: to draw from this situation, to the greatest possible extent, the affirmative humanity that it contains. Or again: to try to be the immortal of the situation” (15).

Badiou rejects this negative and victimizing view of humanity. However, he ends the section with a play-critique from an ethicist: the ethic doesn’t begin with the subject, it begins with the other.

Does the Other Exist?

Badiou begins by looking at Lévinas’ view of the other and determines that a strictly Western, Greek origin of the term will not suffice and that rather a Jewish origin will be more helpful. “The Law, indeed, does not tell me what is, but what is imposed by the existence of others” (19).

This “other”, however, should not be seen as a simple “not-self”, but rather a radical Absolute Other, or, according to Badiou, the ethical name for God. “This means that in order to be intelligible, ethics requires that the Other be in some sense carried by a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience” (22). The ethical obligation stems from this radical alterity which is not bound by space and time, i.e. God.

But, since God does not exist (25), what are we left with? We are left with an infinite alterity which is what is there. The differences that we experience between distinct groups of people exist, but that is not what brings together. What brings together is truth, or rather, what deposes difference: in my terms, common experience.

“The only genuine ethics is of truths in the plural—or, more precisely, the only ethics is of processes of truth, of the labour that brings some truths into the world” (28).

Ethics as a Figure of Nihilism

“Ethics is nihilist because its underlying conviction is that the only thing that can really happen to someone is death” (35). Badiou then proceeds into the realm of bio-ethics, biopolitics, etc.

“Considered as a figure of nihilism, reinforced by the fact that our societies are without a figure that can be represented as universal, ethics oscillates between two complementary desires: a conservative desire, seeking global recognition for the legitimacy of the order peculiar to our “Western’ position—the interweaving of an unbridled and impassive economy with a discourse of law; and a murderous desire that promotes and shrouds, in one and the same gesture, an integral mastery of life—or again, that dooms what is to the ‘Western’ mastery of death” (38).

The Ethic of Truths

“If there is no ethics ‘in general’, that is because there is no abstract Subject, who would adopt it as his shield. There is only a particular kind of animal, convoked by certain circumstances to become a subject—or rather, to enter into the composing of a subject” (40). Ethics is a process whereby the subject needs something to have happened, the subject needs an event that goes beyond the universal and identifies the subject in the particular. The subject has to be honest with the event, and respond faithfully to it. “I shall call ‘truth’ (a truth) the real process of a fidelity to an event: that which this fidelity produces in the situation” (42).

The Problem of Evil

Badiou has already explained how an a priori justification of the concept of Evil is problematic. He then goes on to explain where we must begin to examine the existence of Evil. “If Evil exists, we must conceive it from the starting point of the Good. Without consideration of the Good, and thus of truths, there remains only the cruel innocence of life, which is beneath Good and beneath Evil” (60).

He goes on to claim that, of course there is Evil (look at the Nazi’s), but that the Evil only exists because of truths, and that these truths, though they create Evil, do their best to wipe it out. The process works like this: there is an event, a realization, cognitive disequilibrium, which brings about the seed of truth. Then, there is fidelity and exploration of this event. Finally, there is the truth that is created through a process, that is always in a state of yet-to-be. This allows for the three terrors of Badiou: terror (through simulacrum of truth), betrayal (of fidelity), and disaster (the identification of a truth with total power).

Conclusion

“This maxim [an acceptable concept of ethics] proclaims, in its general version, ‘Keep going!’ Continue to be this ‘someone’, a human animal among others, which nevertheless finds itself seized and displaced by the eventual process of a truth. Continue to be the active part of that subject of a truth that you have happened to become” (90-1).

Also:

“The ethics combines, then, under the imperative to ‘Keep going!’, resources of discernment (do not fall for simulacra), of courage (do not give up), and of moderation (do not get carried away to the extremes of Totality)” (91).

Fun Quote:

“Our century has been a graveyard of positivist ideas and progress” (84)