Wendt, Alexander. 1987. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” International Organization 41:335-370.
Neorealism and World System Theory (WST) both claim to provide structural accounts of IR. Both have a different understanding of system structure. “Neorealists define international system structures in terms of the observable attributes of their member states…, and as a result, they understand the explanatory role of those structures in individualist terms as constraining the choices of preexisting state actors” (335). “World-system theorists, on the other hand, define international system structures in terms of the fundamental organizing principles of the capitalist world economy which underlie and constitute states, and thus they understand the explanatory role of structures in structuralist terms as generating state actors themselves” (335).
These theories could be critiqued from a number of perspectives, but Wendt chooses to explore the ontological critique: “…neorealism embodies an individualist ontology, while world-system theory embodies a holistic one” (336). “A useful way to capture the nature and implications of this difference is to evaluate the two theories in terms of their underlying assumptions about the relationship of system structures to human agents (336).
“All social scientific theories embody an at least implicit solution to the ‘agent-structure problem,’ which situates agents and social structures in relation to one another” (337).
The Agent-Structure Problem:
“The agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life which underlie most social scientific inquiry: 1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (337-8).
Agent and structure are interdependent, co-constitutive, etc.
There are two issues involved in this debate, one is ontological and the other epistemological. The ontological issues, “…concerns the nature of both agents and structures and, because they are in some way mutually implicating, of their interrelationship” (339). There are three possible responses to the “ontological problem”: individualism, structuralism, and structurationism (339). Neorealists and WST theorists embrace the first two solutions. “The structurationist approach, on the other hand, tries to avoid what I shall argue are the negative consequences of individualism and structuralism by giving agents and structures equal ontological status” (339).
The answer to the ontological issue drives the scientists’ answer to the epistemological problem. “This problem actually raises two epistemological issues. The first is the choice of the form of explanation corresponding respectively to agents and structures…On the other hand, approaches that conceive of human beings as nothing more than complex organisms processing stimuli—such as behaviorism—generate agent-explanations that are more mechanistically causal in form” (339-40).
Reductionism and Reification in International Relations Theory:
Wendt compares neorealism and WST in their conception of structuralism, as well as showing that their approaches are similar and that, “…precludes an explanation of the essential properties of their respective primitive units” (340).
Thorough critique of the nature of neorealist conceptions of international structure affecting its atomized, individualist state without the deployment of a theory of the state.
WST: “Without a recognition of the ontological dependence of system structures on state and class agents, Wallerstein is forced into an explanation of that transition in terms of exogenous shocks and the teleological imperatives of an immanent capitalist mode of production” (348).
“World-system theorists, then, like neorealistis, treat their primitive units, in this case the structure of world system, as given and unprobmeatic. This treatment leads them to separate the operation of system structures from the activities of state and class agents—in other words, to reify system structures in a way which leads to static and even functional explanations of state action” (348).
“I have…attempted to show that…neorealism and world-system theory share a common, underlying approach to the agent-structure problem: they both attempt to make either agents or structures into primitive units, which leaves each equally unable to explain the properties of those units, and therefore to justify its theoretically and explanatory claims about state action” (349).
The implication of all of this is the following: theories need to start somewhere, they need to begin with either agents or structures, but they also need to have a theory for why they begin where they begin. Theories can have “primitive units”, but they should also explain that they are not ontologically prior or from God.
Alternative Approach to the Agent-Structure Problem:
“Structuration theory is a relational solution to the agent-structure problem that conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constituted or codetermined entities” (350).
Digresses to the debate between rationalists and empiricists.
Implications: “First, scientific realism attempts to make sense of what practicing natural and social scientists in fact do, rather than prescribing on the legitimacy of certain research practices versus others…in contrast to empiricism, scientific realism can make scientific sense of unobservable generative structures, of structures that are irreducible to and generate their elements…Finally, although there are important problems in translating the protocols and discourse of natural scientific practice directly to the social sciences…the basic realist idea that scientific explanation consists in the identification of underlying causal mechanisms rather than in generalizations about observable regularities does apply to the social sciences, and its adoption there would have important implications for the explanation of social action” (354-5).
“Structuraiton theory attempts to preserve the generative and relational aspects of structuralism while taking explicit conceptual and methodological steps to prevent the analytical separation of generative structures fro the self-understandings and practices of human agents to prevent structural reification” (355). It is analytical, and not substantive, about the, “analysis rather than the substance of the social world” (355).
Core of the program: accept unobservable social structures as generative; stress human intentionality and motivation; there is a unification of agents and structures in a “dialectical synthesis”; social and space/time structures are different (356).
Agents and structures can not be seen or determined independently.
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Krasner: Structural Causes and Regime Consequences
Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables.” International Organization 36:185-205.
“International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (185). “As a starting point, regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables standing between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the other” (185). Krasner raises two questions based on these assumptions: “…what is the relationship between basic causal factors such as power, interest, and values and regimes?...what is the relationship between regimes and related outcomes and behavior?” (185).
Keohane and Nye: “…’sets of governing arrangements’,” “…’networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects’” (186).
Haas: “a regime encompasses a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules, and norms” (186).
Bull: “…’general imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways’” (186).
Keohane: agreements are not regimes.
Jervis: “…’implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest’” (187).
Waltz and Kaplan: “Waltz’s conception of the balance of power, in which states are driven by systemic pressures to repetitive balancing behavior, is not a regime; Kaplan’s conception, in which equilibrium requires commitment to rules that constrain immediate, short-term power maximization…, is a regime” (187).
Hirsch: regime as friendship
“A fundamental distinction must be made between principles and norms on the one hand, and rules and procedures on the other” (187). “Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes” (187). “Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself” (188). “If the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened” (189). “in sum, change within a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not of norms or principles; change of a regime involves alteration of norms and principles; and weakening of a regime involves incoherence among the components of the regime or inconsistency between the regime and related behavior” (189).
Do regimes matter?: “It would take some courage, perhaps more courage than this editor possesses, to answer this question in the negative” (189).
Three points of view as to how regimes matter: “The conventional structural views the regime concept as useless, it not misleading. Modified structural suggests that regimes may matter, but only under fairly restrictive conditions. And Grotian sees regimes as much more pervasive, as inherent attributes of any complex, persistent pattern of human behavior” (190).
Susan Strange represents the conventional structural view.
Keohane and Stein represent the modified structural view.
Hopkins, Puchala and Young represent the Grotian view.
“Regimes are much more easily encompassed by a Grotian worldview. But, as the arguments made by Jervis, Keohane, Stein, Lipson, and Cohen indicate, the concept is not precluded by a realist perspective. The issue si not so much whether one accepts the possibility of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures affecting outcomes and behavior, as what one’s basic assumption is about the normal state of international affairs…Adherents of a structural realist orientation see regimes as a phenomenon whose presence cannot be assumed and whose existence requires careful explanation…From a realist perspective, regimes are phenomena that need to be explained; from a Grotian perspective, they are data to be described” (194).
What created regimes?
-egoistic self-interest: in this volume, Stein and Keohane represent this perspective: one uses game theory, the other microeconomics.
-political power: Two different perspectives: 1.) cosmopolitian/instrumental power: “power is used to secure optimal outcomes for the system as a whole” (197); 2.) particularistic/consummatory: “power is used to enhance the values of specific actors within the system” (197).
-norms and principles: “…norms and principles that influence the regime in a particular issue-area but are not directly related to that issue-area can also be regarded as explanations for the creation, persistence, and dissipation of regimes” (200).
-usage and custom: “Usage refers to regular patterns of behavior based on actual practice; custom, to long-standing practice” (202).
-knowledge: pervasive knowledge can establish regimes (quarantine, for example).
“International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (185). “As a starting point, regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables standing between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the other” (185). Krasner raises two questions based on these assumptions: “…what is the relationship between basic causal factors such as power, interest, and values and regimes?...what is the relationship between regimes and related outcomes and behavior?” (185).
Keohane and Nye: “…’sets of governing arrangements’,” “…’networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects’” (186).
Haas: “a regime encompasses a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules, and norms” (186).
Bull: “…’general imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways’” (186).
Keohane: agreements are not regimes.
Jervis: “…’implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest’” (187).
Waltz and Kaplan: “Waltz’s conception of the balance of power, in which states are driven by systemic pressures to repetitive balancing behavior, is not a regime; Kaplan’s conception, in which equilibrium requires commitment to rules that constrain immediate, short-term power maximization…, is a regime” (187).
Hirsch: regime as friendship
“A fundamental distinction must be made between principles and norms on the one hand, and rules and procedures on the other” (187). “Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes” (187). “Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself” (188). “If the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened” (189). “in sum, change within a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not of norms or principles; change of a regime involves alteration of norms and principles; and weakening of a regime involves incoherence among the components of the regime or inconsistency between the regime and related behavior” (189).
Do regimes matter?: “It would take some courage, perhaps more courage than this editor possesses, to answer this question in the negative” (189).
Three points of view as to how regimes matter: “The conventional structural views the regime concept as useless, it not misleading. Modified structural suggests that regimes may matter, but only under fairly restrictive conditions. And Grotian sees regimes as much more pervasive, as inherent attributes of any complex, persistent pattern of human behavior” (190).
Susan Strange represents the conventional structural view.
Keohane and Stein represent the modified structural view.
Hopkins, Puchala and Young represent the Grotian view.
“Regimes are much more easily encompassed by a Grotian worldview. But, as the arguments made by Jervis, Keohane, Stein, Lipson, and Cohen indicate, the concept is not precluded by a realist perspective. The issue si not so much whether one accepts the possibility of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures affecting outcomes and behavior, as what one’s basic assumption is about the normal state of international affairs…Adherents of a structural realist orientation see regimes as a phenomenon whose presence cannot be assumed and whose existence requires careful explanation…From a realist perspective, regimes are phenomena that need to be explained; from a Grotian perspective, they are data to be described” (194).
What created regimes?
-egoistic self-interest: in this volume, Stein and Keohane represent this perspective: one uses game theory, the other microeconomics.
-political power: Two different perspectives: 1.) cosmopolitian/instrumental power: “power is used to secure optimal outcomes for the system as a whole” (197); 2.) particularistic/consummatory: “power is used to enhance the values of specific actors within the system” (197).
-norms and principles: “…norms and principles that influence the regime in a particular issue-area but are not directly related to that issue-area can also be regarded as explanations for the creation, persistence, and dissipation of regimes” (200).
-usage and custom: “Usage refers to regular patterns of behavior based on actual practice; custom, to long-standing practice” (202).
-knowledge: pervasive knowledge can establish regimes (quarantine, for example).
Reus-Smit: Constructivism
Reus-Smit, C. 2005. “Constructivism.” Theories of international relations.
Throughout the 80’s, there were two debates: between neorealists and neoliberals and between critical theorists and rationalists. Constructivism became a third node in these debates. “Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures” (209).
The chapter then traces the rise of realism by positioning Waltz as a decisive voice giving rise to the distinction between neo and structural realism. Then, moving through dissenting voices like Keohane writing in After Hegemony, where he crucially agrees with realists on the following: importance of anarchy, state centered action and state self interest.
“The debate between neo-realists and neoliberals is often characterized as a debate between those who think states are preoccupied with relative gains versus those who think states are more interested in absolute gains” (212).
Rationalist theories: “First, political actors…are assumed to be atomistic, self-interested and rational” (213). “And they are rational, capable of establishing the most effective and efficient way to realize their interests within the environmental constraints they encounter” (213). “Second, and following from the above, actors interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction. Individuals and states are thought to enter social relations with their interests already formed” (213). “Third…society is understood as a strategic realm, a realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their pre-defined interests” (213).
Reus-smit calls the debate between realists and liberals a “rationalist family feud” (214).
The rise of Constructivism:
Price and Reus-smit argue that Constructivism should be identified with the growth of critical theory. “The rise of constructivisim was prompted by four factors. First, motivated by an attempt to reassert the preeminence of their own conceptions of theory and world politics, leading rationalists challenged critical theorists to move beyond theoretical critique to the substantivec analysis of international relations. While prominent critical theorists condemned the motives behind this challenge, constructivists saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate the heuristic power of non-rationalist perspectives. Second, the end of the Cold War undermined the explanatory pretensions of neo-relaist and neoliberals, neither or which had predicted, nor could adequately comprehend, the systemic transformations reshaping the gtlobal order…Third, by the beginning of the 1990s a new generation of young scholars had emerged who embraced many of the propositions of critical international theory, but who saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically-informed theoretical development…Finally, the advance of the new constructivist perspective was aided by the enthusiasm that mainstream scholars, frustrated by the analytical failings of the dominant realist theories, showed in embracing the new perspective, moving it from the margins to the mainstream of theoretical debate” (216).
Constructivists divided between modernists and post-modernists.
Ideational structures just as important as material structures.
Identities inform interests and actions.
Agents and structures are mutually constituted.
Contrast between constructivism and rationalism: atomistic actor v. social actor; endogenous v. exogenous interests; society as strategic realm or constitutive realm.
Three kinds of Constructivism have emerged: systemic, unit-level and holistic. The first ignores domestic politics and theorises about the interaction of states. Wendt is a systemic constructivist. Unit-level construcitivsm focuses on the units. Katzenstein is a good example of this. “Setting out to explain why two states, with common experiences of military defeat, foreign occupation, economic development, transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and nascent great power status, have adopted very different internal and external national security policies, Katzenstein stresses the importance of institutionalised regulatory and constitutive national social and legal norms” (220). Holist constructivists try to bridge the divide between unit-level constructivism and systemic constructivism. This has brought about two foci: grand shifts in the international system and another focusing on recent changes. The first can be seen through Ruggie’s work exploring the transition from feudal to modern sovereignty. The later can be seen in Kratochwil’s writing on the end of the Cold War (220).
“The rise of constructivism heralds a return to a more sociological, historical and practice-oriented form of international relations scholarship” (227).
Throughout the 80’s, there were two debates: between neorealists and neoliberals and between critical theorists and rationalists. Constructivism became a third node in these debates. “Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures” (209).
The chapter then traces the rise of realism by positioning Waltz as a decisive voice giving rise to the distinction between neo and structural realism. Then, moving through dissenting voices like Keohane writing in After Hegemony, where he crucially agrees with realists on the following: importance of anarchy, state centered action and state self interest.
“The debate between neo-realists and neoliberals is often characterized as a debate between those who think states are preoccupied with relative gains versus those who think states are more interested in absolute gains” (212).
Rationalist theories: “First, political actors…are assumed to be atomistic, self-interested and rational” (213). “And they are rational, capable of establishing the most effective and efficient way to realize their interests within the environmental constraints they encounter” (213). “Second, and following from the above, actors interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction. Individuals and states are thought to enter social relations with their interests already formed” (213). “Third…society is understood as a strategic realm, a realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their pre-defined interests” (213).
Reus-smit calls the debate between realists and liberals a “rationalist family feud” (214).
The rise of Constructivism:
Price and Reus-smit argue that Constructivism should be identified with the growth of critical theory. “The rise of constructivisim was prompted by four factors. First, motivated by an attempt to reassert the preeminence of their own conceptions of theory and world politics, leading rationalists challenged critical theorists to move beyond theoretical critique to the substantivec analysis of international relations. While prominent critical theorists condemned the motives behind this challenge, constructivists saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate the heuristic power of non-rationalist perspectives. Second, the end of the Cold War undermined the explanatory pretensions of neo-relaist and neoliberals, neither or which had predicted, nor could adequately comprehend, the systemic transformations reshaping the gtlobal order…Third, by the beginning of the 1990s a new generation of young scholars had emerged who embraced many of the propositions of critical international theory, but who saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically-informed theoretical development…Finally, the advance of the new constructivist perspective was aided by the enthusiasm that mainstream scholars, frustrated by the analytical failings of the dominant realist theories, showed in embracing the new perspective, moving it from the margins to the mainstream of theoretical debate” (216).
Constructivists divided between modernists and post-modernists.
Ideational structures just as important as material structures.
Identities inform interests and actions.
Agents and structures are mutually constituted.
Contrast between constructivism and rationalism: atomistic actor v. social actor; endogenous v. exogenous interests; society as strategic realm or constitutive realm.
Three kinds of Constructivism have emerged: systemic, unit-level and holistic. The first ignores domestic politics and theorises about the interaction of states. Wendt is a systemic constructivist. Unit-level construcitivsm focuses on the units. Katzenstein is a good example of this. “Setting out to explain why two states, with common experiences of military defeat, foreign occupation, economic development, transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and nascent great power status, have adopted very different internal and external national security policies, Katzenstein stresses the importance of institutionalised regulatory and constitutive national social and legal norms” (220). Holist constructivists try to bridge the divide between unit-level constructivism and systemic constructivism. This has brought about two foci: grand shifts in the international system and another focusing on recent changes. The first can be seen through Ruggie’s work exploring the transition from feudal to modern sovereignty. The later can be seen in Kratochwil’s writing on the end of the Cold War (220).
“The rise of constructivism heralds a return to a more sociological, historical and practice-oriented form of international relations scholarship” (227).
Devetak: Critical Theory
Devetak, R. 1997. “Critical Theory.” Theories of International Relations, Basingstoke 145-178.
“Critical international theory, building especially on the lineage of emancipatory politics extending from Kant via Marx to Habermas, sought to inquire into the possibilities of transforming international relations in order to remove unnecessary constraints on achieving universal freedom and equality” (155). What holds disparate scholars together under the banner of Critical Theory, “…is the idea that the study of international relations should be oriented by an emancipatory politics” (155).
CT came from Kant, Hegel and Marx, it is typically argued. This is not universal, as some argue it goes back to the Greeks, and others that it incorporates Nietzsche and Weber. It is most clearly associated with the Frankfurt school, the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Fromm, Lowenthal, Habermas, etc.
The point is not to look out at the world and say what is, to interpret it, but to change it.
In Cox’s 1981 article, he makes a distinction between problem-solving theories and critical theories. “Problem-solving theories are marked by two main characteristics. First by a positivist methodology; second, by a tendency to legitimize prevailing social and political structures” (160). “Problem-solving theory, as Cox defines it, ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organizes, as the given framework for action” (161).
Critical theory, on the other hand, problematizes prevailing power and knowledge relationships. It does not believe that the re is a world out there that we need to approach, but embraces different starting points that provide for different kinds of inquiry. It embraces “theoretical reflectivity, or, “…a willingness to be open about our philosophical and political starting point and facing the challenge of clarifying ‘how our commitments and values are consistent with our (meta-)theoretical starting points’” (161).
“Critical theory is essentially a critique of the dogmatism it finds in traditional modes of theorizing” (161).
How does one determine ethical positions without an objective market?
“Critical theory’s emancipatory interest is concerned with ‘securing freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness’” (163).
Booth and emancipation: “…’freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do’” (163).
“To conclude this part of the chapter, critical international theory makes a strong case for paying closer attention to the relations between knowledge and interests” (164).
“Informing critical international theory is the spirit, if not the letter, of Marx’s critique of capitalism” (164).
“This section elaborates three dimensions on which critical international theory rethinks political community. The first dimension is the normative and pertains to the philosophical critique of the state as an exclusionary form of political organization. The second is the sociological dimension and relates to the need to develop an account of the origins and evolution of the modern state and states-system. Third is the praxeological dimension concerning practical possibilities for reconstructing international relations along more emancipatory and cosmopolitan lines” (165).
“Critical international theory, building especially on the lineage of emancipatory politics extending from Kant via Marx to Habermas, sought to inquire into the possibilities of transforming international relations in order to remove unnecessary constraints on achieving universal freedom and equality” (155). What holds disparate scholars together under the banner of Critical Theory, “…is the idea that the study of international relations should be oriented by an emancipatory politics” (155).
CT came from Kant, Hegel and Marx, it is typically argued. This is not universal, as some argue it goes back to the Greeks, and others that it incorporates Nietzsche and Weber. It is most clearly associated with the Frankfurt school, the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Fromm, Lowenthal, Habermas, etc.
The point is not to look out at the world and say what is, to interpret it, but to change it.
In Cox’s 1981 article, he makes a distinction between problem-solving theories and critical theories. “Problem-solving theories are marked by two main characteristics. First by a positivist methodology; second, by a tendency to legitimize prevailing social and political structures” (160). “Problem-solving theory, as Cox defines it, ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organizes, as the given framework for action” (161).
Critical theory, on the other hand, problematizes prevailing power and knowledge relationships. It does not believe that the re is a world out there that we need to approach, but embraces different starting points that provide for different kinds of inquiry. It embraces “theoretical reflectivity, or, “…a willingness to be open about our philosophical and political starting point and facing the challenge of clarifying ‘how our commitments and values are consistent with our (meta-)theoretical starting points’” (161).
“Critical theory is essentially a critique of the dogmatism it finds in traditional modes of theorizing” (161).
How does one determine ethical positions without an objective market?
“Critical theory’s emancipatory interest is concerned with ‘securing freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness’” (163).
Booth and emancipation: “…’freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do’” (163).
“To conclude this part of the chapter, critical international theory makes a strong case for paying closer attention to the relations between knowledge and interests” (164).
“Informing critical international theory is the spirit, if not the letter, of Marx’s critique of capitalism” (164).
“This section elaborates three dimensions on which critical international theory rethinks political community. The first dimension is the normative and pertains to the philosophical critique of the state as an exclusionary form of political organization. The second is the sociological dimension and relates to the need to develop an account of the origins and evolution of the modern state and states-system. Third is the praxeological dimension concerning practical possibilities for reconstructing international relations along more emancipatory and cosmopolitan lines” (165).
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
Devetak: Postmodernism
Devetak, R. 1996. “Postmodernism.” Theories of International Relations.
This chapter attempts to present a positive account of post-modernism in IR. It begins by claiming that many see it as a bete noir, but this is because it is just poorly understood. It is also poorly defined from within: many proponents disagree about exactly what postmodernism means.
Power and Knowledge:
The treatment of knowledge is not devoid of political movements, according to post-moderns. This point is most clearly made by Foucault. For Foucault, power and knowledge implied one another, and thus they could never be separated. The scientists’ goal should be to explore the interaction of these two variables, as he did in a variety of books. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault traced the exertion of power from a pre-modern state to a modern state, from the sovereign’s direct imposition onto the body of the criminal, to the clean, clinical approach to modern incarceration. Examples are drawn from the study of sovereignty and its overdetermined characteristics.
Genealogy:
This is a methodological approach of tracing histories of domination from the “perspective of nowhere”. The point is to decenter the traditional historical tellings of events away from narratives of truth and right and towards a narrative that embraces context and contingency. The work of Nietzsche and Campbell are highlighted.
Textual Strategies:
“The ‘reality’ of power politics (like any social reality) is always already constituted through textuality and inscribed modes of representation” (186). This focus on text-based interpretations of politics presents two questions: “…what is meant by textual interplay?...and…how, by using what methods and strategies, does postmodernism seek to disclose this textual interplay?” (186). The focus on textuality stems from On Grammatology. The world is like a text in the sense that it must be interpreted by subjects for it to be real.
Deconstruction:
This is a method that is meant to disrupt previously “settled” understandings of things (histories, meanings, identities, etc.).
Double Reading:
“Derrida seeks to expose this relationship between stability-effects and destabilizations by passing through two readings in any analysis. As expressed by Derrida, double reading is essentially a duplicitous strategy which is ‘simultaneously faithful and violent’. The first reading is a commentary or repetition of the dominant interpretation…the second, counter-memorializing reading unsettles it by applying pressure to those points of instability within a text, discourse or institution” (187-8).
Violence, boundaries, identity, statecraft, are seen as tools in the making of a sovereign state system. What might ethics say about this situation? Post-modern scholars are interested in and find questions like the above stated to be fruitful areas of inquiry. The discussion of ethics moves to Levinas.
This chapter attempts to present a positive account of post-modernism in IR. It begins by claiming that many see it as a bete noir, but this is because it is just poorly understood. It is also poorly defined from within: many proponents disagree about exactly what postmodernism means.
Power and Knowledge:
The treatment of knowledge is not devoid of political movements, according to post-moderns. This point is most clearly made by Foucault. For Foucault, power and knowledge implied one another, and thus they could never be separated. The scientists’ goal should be to explore the interaction of these two variables, as he did in a variety of books. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault traced the exertion of power from a pre-modern state to a modern state, from the sovereign’s direct imposition onto the body of the criminal, to the clean, clinical approach to modern incarceration. Examples are drawn from the study of sovereignty and its overdetermined characteristics.
Genealogy:
This is a methodological approach of tracing histories of domination from the “perspective of nowhere”. The point is to decenter the traditional historical tellings of events away from narratives of truth and right and towards a narrative that embraces context and contingency. The work of Nietzsche and Campbell are highlighted.
Textual Strategies:
“The ‘reality’ of power politics (like any social reality) is always already constituted through textuality and inscribed modes of representation” (186). This focus on text-based interpretations of politics presents two questions: “…what is meant by textual interplay?...and…how, by using what methods and strategies, does postmodernism seek to disclose this textual interplay?” (186). The focus on textuality stems from On Grammatology. The world is like a text in the sense that it must be interpreted by subjects for it to be real.
Deconstruction:
This is a method that is meant to disrupt previously “settled” understandings of things (histories, meanings, identities, etc.).
Double Reading:
“Derrida seeks to expose this relationship between stability-effects and destabilizations by passing through two readings in any analysis. As expressed by Derrida, double reading is essentially a duplicitous strategy which is ‘simultaneously faithful and violent’. The first reading is a commentary or repetition of the dominant interpretation…the second, counter-memorializing reading unsettles it by applying pressure to those points of instability within a text, discourse or institution” (187-8).
Violence, boundaries, identity, statecraft, are seen as tools in the making of a sovereign state system. What might ethics say about this situation? Post-modern scholars are interested in and find questions like the above stated to be fruitful areas of inquiry. The discussion of ethics moves to Levinas.
Grieco: Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics
Grieco, JM. 1997. “Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics.” New Thinking in International Relations Theory 163-201.
The claim is that, ever since the publication of Morgenthau’s seminal book in 1948, realism has been the most important school of thought in international relations. “This is because realist theory addresses the key questions in international relations: What are the causes of conflict and war among nations, and what are the conditions for cooperation dn peace among them?” (163). “Precisely because it engages these fundamental international problems, other scholars, seeking to develop alternative analytical approaches to international affairs...have often defined their theoretical perspectives and research programs in large measure through their opposition to one or more elements of realist theory” (163). “In this chapter I present a critical appreciation of realist international theory” (163). “The view put forward in that section is that realism does in fact provide substantial leverage on many aspects of world politics…in the third and final main section of the chapter I identify two serious conceptual ambiguities and tensions in realist theory and offer a discussion of possible lines of analysis that might address these problems and thus allow realist theory to provide a more effective understanding of politics among nations” (164).
Realist Assumptions:
State is the central focus of enquiry. People fight for what they want, against what they do not want in groups. This insight is provided by R. Gilpin. “For realists, the fundamental unit of political organization for the past several centuries ahs been, and at present it is, the nation-state” (164). While there are other international actors, the state is the one that conditions the ability of all others to act.
Anarchy:
“Realism’s second core assumption is that states coexist in a context of international anarchy, that is, the absence of a reliable central authority to which they can appeal for protection or the redress of grievances” (164). States must be self-help agents. They operate in a world where they can never be sure of the intentions of the other agents. This is a world of constant potential conflict and war.
States are rational, autonomous and unitary:
States’ rationality is goal oriented, these goals are consistent and these goals are achieved through the construction of strategies.
Secondly, states are able to pursue the national interest without undue distracting influence from powerful groups domestically.
Finally, states are able to act unitarily and coherently in relation to other countries.
Propositions:
States are Defensive Actors:
Security is the states’ central goal.
States are Defensive Positionalists:
Relative power gains encourage states to be positionally focused. States are interested in maximizing their relative power capabilities and minimizing the gains of others.
State Interest in Independence and Autonomy:
States seek to be free to pursue their defensive positionalism. States seek to be independent and autonomous.
These assumptions and propositions are then explored vis-à-vis historical examples.
Realists have three main clusters of explanations that derive from the above assumptions:
Balancing: “…if the security of independence of some states are threatened by the growth in power of one state or a group of states, the threatened states, according to realist theory, will respond to that challenge by seeking to take actions that mitigate or offset the growth in power of the rising side” (169-70). In contrast, states may bandwagon, but not in the above example.
System Polarity and Stability:
Stability is a product of the amount of poles in the international system. Waltz says that a multipolar system is prone to conflict.
Hypothesized Constraints on Cooperation:
It is not outside of the border of this theory for states to form alliances to fight common enemies. However, there are constraints, like cheating. Also, because the world is self-help, alliances are also difficult to form. Finally, there is a difficulty in cooperating because of the logic of relative gains.
How, then, could cooperation take place? Through a hegemon. For example, Gilpin and Krasner assert that a liberal international order will arise only if there is a state that is strong enough and willing enough to take on that responsibility.
Criticisms:
Change: Realism can not account for international change.
Does not look at the domestic.
(These are both followed by lengthy explanations of possible Realist responses to these criticisms)
Two other issues that may be more problematic, from Grieco’s perspective: The EU.
Secondly: “Does anarchy lead ‘normal’ states to be security or power maximizers, and is there an observable difference between the two goals?” (186).
The claim is that, ever since the publication of Morgenthau’s seminal book in 1948, realism has been the most important school of thought in international relations. “This is because realist theory addresses the key questions in international relations: What are the causes of conflict and war among nations, and what are the conditions for cooperation dn peace among them?” (163). “Precisely because it engages these fundamental international problems, other scholars, seeking to develop alternative analytical approaches to international affairs...have often defined their theoretical perspectives and research programs in large measure through their opposition to one or more elements of realist theory” (163). “In this chapter I present a critical appreciation of realist international theory” (163). “The view put forward in that section is that realism does in fact provide substantial leverage on many aspects of world politics…in the third and final main section of the chapter I identify two serious conceptual ambiguities and tensions in realist theory and offer a discussion of possible lines of analysis that might address these problems and thus allow realist theory to provide a more effective understanding of politics among nations” (164).
Realist Assumptions:
State is the central focus of enquiry. People fight for what they want, against what they do not want in groups. This insight is provided by R. Gilpin. “For realists, the fundamental unit of political organization for the past several centuries ahs been, and at present it is, the nation-state” (164). While there are other international actors, the state is the one that conditions the ability of all others to act.
Anarchy:
“Realism’s second core assumption is that states coexist in a context of international anarchy, that is, the absence of a reliable central authority to which they can appeal for protection or the redress of grievances” (164). States must be self-help agents. They operate in a world where they can never be sure of the intentions of the other agents. This is a world of constant potential conflict and war.
States are rational, autonomous and unitary:
States’ rationality is goal oriented, these goals are consistent and these goals are achieved through the construction of strategies.
Secondly, states are able to pursue the national interest without undue distracting influence from powerful groups domestically.
Finally, states are able to act unitarily and coherently in relation to other countries.
Propositions:
States are Defensive Actors:
Security is the states’ central goal.
States are Defensive Positionalists:
Relative power gains encourage states to be positionally focused. States are interested in maximizing their relative power capabilities and minimizing the gains of others.
State Interest in Independence and Autonomy:
States seek to be free to pursue their defensive positionalism. States seek to be independent and autonomous.
These assumptions and propositions are then explored vis-à-vis historical examples.
Realists have three main clusters of explanations that derive from the above assumptions:
Balancing: “…if the security of independence of some states are threatened by the growth in power of one state or a group of states, the threatened states, according to realist theory, will respond to that challenge by seeking to take actions that mitigate or offset the growth in power of the rising side” (169-70). In contrast, states may bandwagon, but not in the above example.
System Polarity and Stability:
Stability is a product of the amount of poles in the international system. Waltz says that a multipolar system is prone to conflict.
Hypothesized Constraints on Cooperation:
It is not outside of the border of this theory for states to form alliances to fight common enemies. However, there are constraints, like cheating. Also, because the world is self-help, alliances are also difficult to form. Finally, there is a difficulty in cooperating because of the logic of relative gains.
How, then, could cooperation take place? Through a hegemon. For example, Gilpin and Krasner assert that a liberal international order will arise only if there is a state that is strong enough and willing enough to take on that responsibility.
Criticisms:
Change: Realism can not account for international change.
Does not look at the domestic.
(These are both followed by lengthy explanations of possible Realist responses to these criticisms)
Two other issues that may be more problematic, from Grieco’s perspective: The EU.
Secondly: “Does anarchy lead ‘normal’ states to be security or power maximizers, and is there an observable difference between the two goals?” (186).
Morgenthau: Politics among Nations
Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.” New York.
Six Principles of Political Realism:
1.
“Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure” (4).
“For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts” (4).
Must approach politics through the lenses of rationality and assume that leaders are operating with a certain amount of rational calculus.
2.
“The main signpost that helps poli8tical realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (5). This is the connection between the rationality of the actors and what they are striving for. “The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible” (5).
Political realism’s rationality is both descriptive and normative. It is rational for states to maximize the cost-benefit analysis that they undertake. It is also something that should happen if they are to survive. This has nothing to do with intentions, as the example of Neville Chamberlain illustrates.
3.
“Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” (10). “…the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (11). “The same observations apply to the concept of power…Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man” (11).
4.
“Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action” (12). “There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (12). “Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics” (12).
5.
“Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted…to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purpose of the universe” (13). “…it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them” (13).
6.
“The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound…Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth…” (13).
Realism views things in their nature, not as we would like them to be. They focus “political man” as a power maximizer as other disciplines have their own distinct foci.
Six Principles of Political Realism:
1.
“Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure” (4).
“For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts” (4).
Must approach politics through the lenses of rationality and assume that leaders are operating with a certain amount of rational calculus.
2.
“The main signpost that helps poli8tical realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (5). This is the connection between the rationality of the actors and what they are striving for. “The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible” (5).
Political realism’s rationality is both descriptive and normative. It is rational for states to maximize the cost-benefit analysis that they undertake. It is also something that should happen if they are to survive. This has nothing to do with intentions, as the example of Neville Chamberlain illustrates.
3.
“Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” (10). “…the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (11). “The same observations apply to the concept of power…Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man” (11).
4.
“Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action” (12). “There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (12). “Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics” (12).
5.
“Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted…to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purpose of the universe” (13). “…it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them” (13).
6.
“The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound…Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth…” (13).
Realism views things in their nature, not as we would like them to be. They focus “political man” as a power maximizer as other disciplines have their own distinct foci.
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