Percy, Sarah V. Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law. International Organization 61 (April 2007): 367-397.
“Private security companies and their mercenary predecessors appear to be uncontroversial actors in international relations. States have a long history of turning to the private sector to provide military services. Indeed, mercenaries are referred to as the worlds’ second-oldest profession and played important roles in state militaries until the midninteenth century” (367).
“...the international law designed to deal with [the acceptability of private forces] is so weak that it is virtually unusable” (368). There was a strong anti-mercenary norm throughout the late 20th centuries. States abided by this law and attempted to institutionalize it through the creation of laws. However, these laws are weak and ineffectual, also highlighting the state’s continues desire to rely on private actors to support military operations. “The conventional wisdom about mercenaries and anti-mercenary law is inaccurate, and the study of a weak law caused by a strong norm provides a revealing window into the relationship between social and legal norms” (368).
Four possible explanations for a weak mercenary law: “…in the 1970s and 1980s states did not care enough to create effective law because mercenaries did not cause enough practical difficulty nor did they prompt enough moral concern to require legal attention…A second argument is that states purposely created loopholes in the law on mercenaries…A third explanation of the weakness of anti-mercenary law might be that the most affected state4s, mainly weaker African states, were the most interested in creating international law to deal with mercenaries, and that more powerful Western states were not interested…Finally, the law against mercenaries could be ineffective because it reflects the lowest common denominator on which states could agree, and this minimal agreement has resulted in weak law” (369-70).
“Katzenstein defines norms as, ‘collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity’” (371).
“The norm against mercenary use stems from the idea that mercenaries are financially motivated fighters who use force outside the bound of the sovereign state” (371).
“This section explains that the evident weakness of the law reflects the fact that the norm against mercenary use was strongly influential but impossible to translate into legally sensible terms” (375). “I then argue that another major weakness in the law, the difficulty of proving financial motivation, in fact directly reflects the influence of the anti-mercenary norm. The law’s problems were the side effects of trying to solve problems and make sure that the law would apply only to mercenaries” (375).
“Another explanation for the weaknesses of the law on mercenaries is that for law to be effective, it must be supported by powerful states. The fact that the creation of anti-mercenary law was largely spearheaded by African states and apparently ignored by Western states might provide evidence for this argument” (381).
“The fact that a strong social norm against mercenary use did not result in similarly strong law not only reveals that weak law does not always represent a normative failure, but also indicates some important features of the relationship between social and legal norms” (386).
“The international law on mercenaries might be so flawed that any mercenary caught under it is unlucky or foolish and might deserve to be shot in the company of his lawyer, but its flaws provide a remarkable opportunity to analyze the relationship between social and legal norms, and the process through which a social norm becomes a law…It is too easy to dismiss weak law as indicating nothing other than a predictable and expected failure. Attention to the normative reasons why law might be weak, however, can lead to understanding that there is not a clear relationship between norms and law; that in becoming legal norms, social norms do not necessarily become stronger or more effective. Scholars who take the role of norms seriously are perhaps too tempted to examine successful law because it better demonstrates that norms can influence state behavior. And scholars who are suspicious that norms can influence states are too quick to seize on weak laws as demonstrating problems with normative commitment. Anti-mercenary law demonstrates that the study of bad law can be good for the study of international relations” (394).
Showing posts with label Norms. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Norms. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Adler: The Emergence of Cooperation
Adler, Emanuel. The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control, International Organization 46 (Winter 1992): 101-146.
Adler approaches the study of nuclear arms control from the perspective of evolutionary changes made on two levels: domestically and internationally. This study emphasizes the causal force of epistemic communities in shaping the rules of the nuclear game. This approach also claims that material accounts of this story can not be fully explanatory as they are lacking a substantive causal driver.
“The epistemic community approach has some clear ‘comparative advantages.’ First, it allows us to understand why superpower cooperation was conceptualized via arms control in the first place. Second, it increases our sensitivity to domestic political factors, especially to the notion that within each national actor different interpretations of the national interest compete for the shaping of international agendas as well as international practices. Third, in ways that allow for empirical research, focusing on an epistemic community draws our attention to the impact of scientific knowledge on international cooperation processes. Fourth, it helps us to see that, in spite of or even because of superpower disagreement over political interests and visions, the fact that [Soviets also understood ideational drivers to be important] was not inconsequential for peaceful change…Sixth, common epistemic understandings proved to be more lasting than disagreements over long-term goals” (104).
Adler then deploys an “evolutionary research framework” for exploring this issue. This framework involves the use of five variables: units of variation, innovation, selection, diffusion and units of effective modification (104).
Who represent the epistemic community for arms control? “Two subgroups constituted this community. One group of experts…considered the underlying cause of international conflict to be the clash between the interests of nations as they pursue their seperat4e goals…The other group…believed that armaments were indeed a serious cause of international tension and that therefore reducing weapons would reduce tensions…These two groups converged into an epistemic community because, surprising as it may seem, they were in agreement about the short-term advantages and necessity of arms control and there was scarcely member of either group who did not concede the validity of the recommendations of the other” (111).
Conclusion:
“First, the community created an intellectual climate favorable to arms control…Second, the members produced the technical knowledge required to deal with nuclear arms control…Third, the community focused attention on cooperative phenomena and helped provide the superpowers with reasons why…it as important that they cooperate…Forth, it paved the way for the creation of vested interests in arms control…Fifth,…[it] helped generate an awareness about arms control that eventually led to public support for it…Sixth, arms controllers helped persuade Congress about the value of specific arms control agreements…Seventh, members were able to propose a logically coherent arms control negotiation agenda and helped think through the bargaining positions to be taken in the ABM negotiations…Eighth, the community helped formulate specific norms and rules, researched and proposed verification means, and suggested posttreaty reviews and conditions for withdrawal from agreements…Ninth, arms controllers in many cases became what Robert Gilpin called ‘full partners with politicians, administration, and military officers in the formulations of policy’…Finally, the community was instrumental in transmitting arms control ideas to the Soviet Union” (140-2).
Adler approaches the study of nuclear arms control from the perspective of evolutionary changes made on two levels: domestically and internationally. This study emphasizes the causal force of epistemic communities in shaping the rules of the nuclear game. This approach also claims that material accounts of this story can not be fully explanatory as they are lacking a substantive causal driver.
“The epistemic community approach has some clear ‘comparative advantages.’ First, it allows us to understand why superpower cooperation was conceptualized via arms control in the first place. Second, it increases our sensitivity to domestic political factors, especially to the notion that within each national actor different interpretations of the national interest compete for the shaping of international agendas as well as international practices. Third, in ways that allow for empirical research, focusing on an epistemic community draws our attention to the impact of scientific knowledge on international cooperation processes. Fourth, it helps us to see that, in spite of or even because of superpower disagreement over political interests and visions, the fact that [Soviets also understood ideational drivers to be important] was not inconsequential for peaceful change…Sixth, common epistemic understandings proved to be more lasting than disagreements over long-term goals” (104).
Adler then deploys an “evolutionary research framework” for exploring this issue. This framework involves the use of five variables: units of variation, innovation, selection, diffusion and units of effective modification (104).
Who represent the epistemic community for arms control? “Two subgroups constituted this community. One group of experts…considered the underlying cause of international conflict to be the clash between the interests of nations as they pursue their seperat4e goals…The other group…believed that armaments were indeed a serious cause of international tension and that therefore reducing weapons would reduce tensions…These two groups converged into an epistemic community because, surprising as it may seem, they were in agreement about the short-term advantages and necessity of arms control and there was scarcely member of either group who did not concede the validity of the recommendations of the other” (111).
Conclusion:
“First, the community created an intellectual climate favorable to arms control…Second, the members produced the technical knowledge required to deal with nuclear arms control…Third, the community focused attention on cooperative phenomena and helped provide the superpowers with reasons why…it as important that they cooperate…Forth, it paved the way for the creation of vested interests in arms control…Fifth,…[it] helped generate an awareness about arms control that eventually led to public support for it…Sixth, arms controllers helped persuade Congress about the value of specific arms control agreements…Seventh, members were able to propose a logically coherent arms control negotiation agenda and helped think through the bargaining positions to be taken in the ABM negotiations…Eighth, the community helped formulate specific norms and rules, researched and proposed verification means, and suggested posttreaty reviews and conditions for withdrawal from agreements…Ninth, arms controllers in many cases became what Robert Gilpin called ‘full partners with politicians, administration, and military officers in the formulations of policy’…Finally, the community was instrumental in transmitting arms control ideas to the Soviet Union” (140-2).
Zacher: The Territorial Integrity Norm
Zacher, Mark W. The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force. International Organization 55 (Spring 2001): 215-250.
“…the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries,” is an important change in the interactions of states internationally. This is referred to in this piece as the “territorial integrity norm” (215). This represents a dramatic shift from earlier periods of more intense and frequent territorial disputes that digressed into all out war.
Zacher outlines historical accounts of territorial wars and compares different time periods qualitatively and quantitatively.
Why did the territorial integrity norm become embedded?
“First, states have backed the norm for both instrumental and ideational reasons, though the former have dominated…Second, the reasons for such a change in beliefs and practices have varied among countries, and no single factor explains the support for the norm among a particular grouping of states” (238).
“Clearly, a central source of the norm ahs been the industrialized world’s fear that territorial revisionism could ignite a major war that would cause great human suffering” (245).
“Wars of territorial aggrandizement since 1945 have, for the most part, concerned developing states’ dissatisfaction with the boundaries they inherited from the colonial powers; but these quarrels are largely coming to an end” (245).
“One should not discount the contribution of economic trends in the strengthening of the territorial integrity norm, especially in recent decades” (245).
“There is not a simple answer to why the territorial integrity norm has emerged as a central pillar of the international order. Different reasons were key for two major groupings of states, and the coincidence of several factors seems to have been crucial to their backing” (246).
“…the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries,” is an important change in the interactions of states internationally. This is referred to in this piece as the “territorial integrity norm” (215). This represents a dramatic shift from earlier periods of more intense and frequent territorial disputes that digressed into all out war.
Zacher outlines historical accounts of territorial wars and compares different time periods qualitatively and quantitatively.
Why did the territorial integrity norm become embedded?
“First, states have backed the norm for both instrumental and ideational reasons, though the former have dominated…Second, the reasons for such a change in beliefs and practices have varied among countries, and no single factor explains the support for the norm among a particular grouping of states” (238).
“Clearly, a central source of the norm ahs been the industrialized world’s fear that territorial revisionism could ignite a major war that would cause great human suffering” (245).
“Wars of territorial aggrandizement since 1945 have, for the most part, concerned developing states’ dissatisfaction with the boundaries they inherited from the colonial powers; but these quarrels are largely coming to an end” (245).
“One should not discount the contribution of economic trends in the strengthening of the territorial integrity norm, especially in recent decades” (245).
“There is not a simple answer to why the territorial integrity norm has emerged as a central pillar of the international order. Different reasons were key for two major groupings of states, and the coincidence of several factors seems to have been crucial to their backing” (246).
Nadelman: Global Prohibition Regimes
Nadelman, Ethan A.. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. International Organization 44 (Autumn 1990): 479-526.
“This article analyzes how and why particular norms have evolved into global prohibition regimes and why they have proven more or less successful in suppressing deviant activities” (479-80).
“It is true that international regimes tend to reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant members of international society. But it is also true…that moral and emotional factors related to neither political nor economic advantage but instead involving religious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments, faith in universalism, compassion, conscience, paternalism, fear, prejudice, and the compulsion to proselytize can and do play important roles in the creation and the evolution of international regimes” (480).
Certain things are globally recognized as being illegitimate: rape, incest, violating sovereignty to catch criminals, human sacrifice and cannibalism, for example. The question posed by Nadelman is why do some prohibition regimes become global in scale (482)?
“Most global prohibition regimes, including those targeted against piracy, slavery, and drug trafficking, evidence a common evolutionary pattern consisting of four or five stages. During the first stage, most societies regard the targeted activity as entirely legitimate under certain conditions and with respect to certain groups of people; states often are the principal protagonists and abettors of the activity…During the second stage, the activity is redefined as a problem and as an evil—generally by international legal scholars, religious groups, and other moral entrepreneurs—and explicit government involvement in the activity is gradually delegitimized…During the third stage, regime proponents begin to agitate actively for the suppression and criminalization of the activity by all states and the formation of international conventions…If the efforts of the regime proponents prove successful, a fourth stage begins. During this stage, the activity becomes the subject of criminal laws and police action throughout much of the world, and international institutions and conventions emerge to play a coordinating role…In some cases, a fifth stage is attained, during which the incidence of the proscribed activity is greatly reduced, persisting only on a small scale and in obscure locations” (494-5).
“Success in attaining the fifth stage of regime development has thus come to depend primarily on the nature of the criminal activity and its susceptibility to criminal justice measures, both of which can be strongly influenced over time by technological developments” (486).
Nadelman then examines piracy, slavery, criminals in other sovereign territories, drug trafficking, prostitution and the killing of whales and elephants.
“Norms that evolve into global prohibition regimes typically have two features in common: they mirror the criminal laws of states that have dominated global society to date…, and they target criminal activities that in one way or another transcend national borders” (524).
Global prohibition regimes can be greatly undermined by states that choose not to conform. One of the great challenges for these regimes is whether or not non-conformist states can be made to fall in line.
“This article analyzes how and why particular norms have evolved into global prohibition regimes and why they have proven more or less successful in suppressing deviant activities” (479-80).
“It is true that international regimes tend to reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant members of international society. But it is also true…that moral and emotional factors related to neither political nor economic advantage but instead involving religious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments, faith in universalism, compassion, conscience, paternalism, fear, prejudice, and the compulsion to proselytize can and do play important roles in the creation and the evolution of international regimes” (480).
Certain things are globally recognized as being illegitimate: rape, incest, violating sovereignty to catch criminals, human sacrifice and cannibalism, for example. The question posed by Nadelman is why do some prohibition regimes become global in scale (482)?
“Most global prohibition regimes, including those targeted against piracy, slavery, and drug trafficking, evidence a common evolutionary pattern consisting of four or five stages. During the first stage, most societies regard the targeted activity as entirely legitimate under certain conditions and with respect to certain groups of people; states often are the principal protagonists and abettors of the activity…During the second stage, the activity is redefined as a problem and as an evil—generally by international legal scholars, religious groups, and other moral entrepreneurs—and explicit government involvement in the activity is gradually delegitimized…During the third stage, regime proponents begin to agitate actively for the suppression and criminalization of the activity by all states and the formation of international conventions…If the efforts of the regime proponents prove successful, a fourth stage begins. During this stage, the activity becomes the subject of criminal laws and police action throughout much of the world, and international institutions and conventions emerge to play a coordinating role…In some cases, a fifth stage is attained, during which the incidence of the proscribed activity is greatly reduced, persisting only on a small scale and in obscure locations” (494-5).
“Success in attaining the fifth stage of regime development has thus come to depend primarily on the nature of the criminal activity and its susceptibility to criminal justice measures, both of which can be strongly influenced over time by technological developments” (486).
Nadelman then examines piracy, slavery, criminals in other sovereign territories, drug trafficking, prostitution and the killing of whales and elephants.
“Norms that evolve into global prohibition regimes typically have two features in common: they mirror the criminal laws of states that have dominated global society to date…, and they target criminal activities that in one way or another transcend national borders” (524).
Global prohibition regimes can be greatly undermined by states that choose not to conform. One of the great challenges for these regimes is whether or not non-conformist states can be made to fall in line.
Klotz: Norms Reconstituting Interests
Klotz, Audie. Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa. International Organization 49 (Summer 1995): 451-478.
The example of the norm of racial equality provides the driving variable for sanctions to be imposed on South Africa by all major international players with no regard for material losses.
It was not always the case that the norm of racial equality promoted action on the part of all of the world’s major powers to denounce the apartheid situation in South Africa. While there were efforts on the part of UN nations to denounce the practice, these did not amount to all out restriction of trade with the southern-most African nation. The US imposed sanctions on South Africa in 1986.
“This case study illustrates empirically one of the fundamental theoretical claims of a constructivist theory of international relations: norms are constitutive components of both the internationals system and states’ interests” (460).
The paper outlines schematically different ways in that norms and interests affect state behavior from the perspective of different theoretical approaches.
“Constructivist theory claims that states are socially constructed…” (477).
“Constructivist theory also claims that agents and structures reconsittute4 each other in a n iterative process but thus far has retained the traditional assumption of states as units…Constructivist theory argues that global norms are part of the explanation for the definition of state and individual interests. The result is a reformulated research agenda that illuminates the independent role of norms in determining actors’ identities and interests” (478).
The example of the norm of racial equality provides the driving variable for sanctions to be imposed on South Africa by all major international players with no regard for material losses.
It was not always the case that the norm of racial equality promoted action on the part of all of the world’s major powers to denounce the apartheid situation in South Africa. While there were efforts on the part of UN nations to denounce the practice, these did not amount to all out restriction of trade with the southern-most African nation. The US imposed sanctions on South Africa in 1986.
“This case study illustrates empirically one of the fundamental theoretical claims of a constructivist theory of international relations: norms are constitutive components of both the internationals system and states’ interests” (460).
The paper outlines schematically different ways in that norms and interests affect state behavior from the perspective of different theoretical approaches.
“Constructivist theory claims that states are socially constructed…” (477).
“Constructivist theory also claims that agents and structures reconsittute4 each other in a n iterative process but thus far has retained the traditional assumption of states as units…Constructivist theory argues that global norms are part of the explanation for the definition of state and individual interests. The result is a reformulated research agenda that illuminates the independent role of norms in determining actors’ identities and interests” (478).
Jepperson, et. al.: Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security
Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein. Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security. in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in International Politics
“First, we argue that the security environments in which states are embedded are in important part cultural and institutional, rather than just material.” “Second, we argue that cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states-what we call state ‘identity’” (31).
They also argue that there are three different levels to international society. More specifically, “…three layers to the international cultural environments in which national security policies are made” (34). These are formal institutions/security regimes like NATO, or arms regimes like SALT, world political culture comprising international norms like sovereignty, etc., and lastly, “…international patterns of amity and enmity…” (34).
The identity of states is formed through these security regimes, “…as opposed to just the behavior of states” (34).
They do not claim to put forth a theory, but rather an “orientating framework that highlights a set of effects and mechanisms that have been neglected in mainstream security studies” (36).
They deploy a 2x2 box that highlights the distinction between the degree to that the environment shapes the identity of units (the x axis) and the degree to that the environment is culturally/institutionally dense. Marxism and sociological perspectives involve hi9gh degrees of unit/environment relations while realism and neoliberalism involve low degrees of unit relations with the environment (i.e., there is clearly a more material focus). Sociological and Neoliberal perspectives involve high cultural density and Marxist and Realist perspectives involve lower cultural/institutional densities (38).
The authors caution readers not to misread a focus on material forces to be solely about conflict and a focus on ideational forces to be solely about cooperation.
There is then a discussion of how this 2x2 grid can be applied to domestic policies.
The causal diagram that is presented on page 53 represents the effects of environmental structure on the construction of identity, interests and policies, and how these effects are then mostly over-determined. The first cause is that of the effects of norms: “cultural or institutional elements of states’ environment…shape the national security interests or the security policies of states” (52). Secondly, “cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or domestic environment…shape state identity” (52). Thirdly, “variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states” (52). Fourthly, “configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities” (52). Finally, “state policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure” (53).
“First, we argue that the security environments in which states are embedded are in important part cultural and institutional, rather than just material.” “Second, we argue that cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states-what we call state ‘identity’” (31).
They also argue that there are three different levels to international society. More specifically, “…three layers to the international cultural environments in which national security policies are made” (34). These are formal institutions/security regimes like NATO, or arms regimes like SALT, world political culture comprising international norms like sovereignty, etc., and lastly, “…international patterns of amity and enmity…” (34).
The identity of states is formed through these security regimes, “…as opposed to just the behavior of states” (34).
They do not claim to put forth a theory, but rather an “orientating framework that highlights a set of effects and mechanisms that have been neglected in mainstream security studies” (36).
They deploy a 2x2 box that highlights the distinction between the degree to that the environment shapes the identity of units (the x axis) and the degree to that the environment is culturally/institutionally dense. Marxism and sociological perspectives involve hi9gh degrees of unit/environment relations while realism and neoliberalism involve low degrees of unit relations with the environment (i.e., there is clearly a more material focus). Sociological and Neoliberal perspectives involve high cultural density and Marxist and Realist perspectives involve lower cultural/institutional densities (38).
The authors caution readers not to misread a focus on material forces to be solely about conflict and a focus on ideational forces to be solely about cooperation.
There is then a discussion of how this 2x2 grid can be applied to domestic policies.
The causal diagram that is presented on page 53 represents the effects of environmental structure on the construction of identity, interests and policies, and how these effects are then mostly over-determined. The first cause is that of the effects of norms: “cultural or institutional elements of states’ environment…shape the national security interests or the security policies of states” (52). Secondly, “cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or domestic environment…shape state identity” (52). Thirdly, “variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states” (52). Fourthly, “configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities” (52). Finally, “state policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure” (53).
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