Khan, H. 2008. Making Globalization Work: Towards Global Economic Justice.
"Globalization as a corporate-led process has come under much justifiable criticism. This paper attempts to give the term analytic content distinct from its more ideological formulations. It then focuses on a normative analysis of globalization from the capabilities perspective. A freedom-centered perspective such as the capabilities approach emphasizes policies and institutions that can enhance freedom globally and locally. A global governance structure based on transparent principles of both economic efficiency and social justice is shown to be a desirable state of affairs; however, the present fractured process of globalization is more likely to end up in a fragmenting regionalism or even national protectionism and rivalry. Multilateral cooperation on the basis of the framework advanced here is an urgent necessity. To this end the creation of international regimes of cooperation in areas ranging from trade and finance to ecological and women's and minorities rights issues must be put on the international and national social and political agendas" (1).
How is it possible to move towards regionalism if the overall stated goal of globalization is to increase international cooperation and openness? "The main argument offered is that there is a contradiction in the heart of the current US and the IFIs-led globalization that stems from their seeming refusal to understand the implications of unevenness in the real world. This also has led to their neglect of some vital principles of global justice" (2).
Globalization has become a term that is tossed about with abandon in certain circles; its meaning has become amorphous. The effects of increased international openness are not universally felt, for example, standard H-O models would claim that the global south should find itself increasing parity with the global north and less-skilled positions move in that direction while less skilled workers in the global north should expect to suffer. The empirical evidence of this is not at all clear. Some call this a fractured-globalism.
"In this paper globalization is conceptualized as asset of cross-cutting economic, technological, cultural and communicative processes that have grown enormously since the end of WWII. In simple terms globalization refers to the integration of the world economy in such a way that what is unfolding in one part of the world has clear, sustained and observable repercussions on the socioeconomic environment and lifestyles of individuals and communities elsewhere" (5).
In an earlier work, the author highlighted 5 areas where global justice can take root within the globalization debate: international trade and monetary regimes; international capital flows; international ecological considerations; asset redistribution and human development; and gender issues (6-7).
"Capabilities can be construed as general powers of human body and mind that can be acquired, maintained, nurtured and developed" (9). There is then a reproduction of Crocker's taxonomy of both Sen and Nussbaum's capabilities approach (9-10).
"Regarding the intense discussion on the effect of globalization on the welfare and economic growth of developing countries, the dominant view appears to be that closer economic integration will enhance the flow of goods and services as well as factors of production, and hence promote economic growth and the welfare of all people. It is believed that globalization will result in a better division of labor, allowing developing countries...to specialize in labor intensive commodities while permitting developing countries to use their workers in more productive ways...Others...reject this argument and contend that globalization and regionalization has largely benefited the powerful economic entities, thereby marginalizing weak regions and nations. It is argues that globalization, while increasing the importance of service industries and skilled labor, also reduces the importance of primary commodities and unskilled labor...Consequently, countries which were once considered wealthy, endowed with natural resources, are no more in the list of rich countries...In modern economy, technology, knowledge and skills stand as the only course of comparative advantage" (12-3).
The Asian Financial Crisis of the late 90s is explored as an example of the contradiction of globalization.
"Globalization has obviously had some positive impacts such as the transfer of technology, raising of productivity in specific sectors, and the improvement of the living standard of some people in developing and developed countries. However, current type of globalization generally, while benefiting certain regions or groups, is marginalizing and distressing the vulnerable and disadvantaged regions and people. This type of corporate-led globalization is also forging imbalances among different human needs by privileging the acquisition of material wealth over human and spiritual values, resulting in violence, alienation and despair" (18).
Showing posts with label Capabilities Approach. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Capabilities Approach. Show all posts
Friday, January 2, 2009
Friday, May 16, 2008
Sen: Inequality Reexamined
Sen, Amartya K. (1992). Inequality Reexamined: Harvard University Press.
Chapter 1: Equality of What?
We have to address two questions if we are going to deal with issues of equality: firstly, we must ask, “Why equality?” and secondly, we must ask, “Equality of what?” Sen wonders whether or not we need to answer the first question if we have already argued in favor of the later. He claims that, “…question (1) in this analysis looks very much like the poor man’s question (2)” (12).
Sen then explores different normative theories, and finds that they each have an egalitarian core: it is less a question of why equality and more a question of equality of what that is answered by these philosophers. For example, even those who are seen as being critics of equality eventually settle in an are of equal treatment. For example, if a theorist posits that people are inherently unequal in their abilities, they should be equally supported in light of the beginning inequality. Even Nozick believes that people’s property rights should be equally treated. Sen wonders, must all ethical theories have a character of equality in order to be valid?
We are all fundamentally unequal. We are born with different endowments, different situational opportunities and different constraints. Thus, in constructing an ethical theory, we must be concerned with determining a space where we can all achieve equality. We must prune certain mutually exclusive opportunities to identify equality in the interest of promoting one of these branches of equal opportunity. We must choose one item on that we can be equal at the expense of the consequences of this decision, which is the inequality of individuals in a different realm.
Also, liberty and equality can find places in that they butt heads. Sen points to Nozick as being an ethical theorist who is routinely identified as being anti-egalitarian. This is because he is so heavily focused on the promotion of ideals of liberty. Sen believes that this logic is, “…altogether faulty” (22). It is not that liberty and equality stand in juxtaposition with one another, but rather that liberty is one of the goods that can be equally distributed, like income or justice.
This brings into question the very nature of the use of equality in the determination of ethical standards. “If equality can possibly speak with so many voices, can we take any of its demands seriously?” (23). The answer is yes. Sen goes on to claim that, “…the need to value equality in some space that is seen to be particularly important is not an empty demand” (24). He also claims that, “…equality can be a particularly powerful and exacting demand” (24). Finally, he explains that equality in so many different realms doesn’t at all lessen the powerful effect of equality, but rather is indicative of the difficulty of individuals to come together to agree on what should be valued.
In fact, the plurality of these different focuses can actually help to construct an ethical argument. Sen explores Rawl’s theory of fairness and finds that there is a plurality of foci: there is a focus on primary good equality on one side and freedom or well-being on the other provides for an interesting approach to ethical reasoning. “The plurality of focal variables can make a great difference precisely because of the diversity of human beings” (28).
Sen ends the chapter by evaluating a standard measure of equality: income. He finds it to be wholly lacking. Income equality is a rough measure that goes a long way to obscuring other important metrics of inequality and equality because it is so analytically elegant and relatively easy to apply. Because these approaches are so widely used and easily deployed, they go a long way to obscuring other ways of measuring equality. Other important measures of inequality, like freedom and well-being, can be affected in many different ways by different levels of income; the two variables do not move together in lock-step.
Chapter 1: Equality of What?
We have to address two questions if we are going to deal with issues of equality: firstly, we must ask, “Why equality?” and secondly, we must ask, “Equality of what?” Sen wonders whether or not we need to answer the first question if we have already argued in favor of the later. He claims that, “…question (1) in this analysis looks very much like the poor man’s question (2)” (12).
Sen then explores different normative theories, and finds that they each have an egalitarian core: it is less a question of why equality and more a question of equality of what that is answered by these philosophers. For example, even those who are seen as being critics of equality eventually settle in an are of equal treatment. For example, if a theorist posits that people are inherently unequal in their abilities, they should be equally supported in light of the beginning inequality. Even Nozick believes that people’s property rights should be equally treated. Sen wonders, must all ethical theories have a character of equality in order to be valid?
We are all fundamentally unequal. We are born with different endowments, different situational opportunities and different constraints. Thus, in constructing an ethical theory, we must be concerned with determining a space where we can all achieve equality. We must prune certain mutually exclusive opportunities to identify equality in the interest of promoting one of these branches of equal opportunity. We must choose one item on that we can be equal at the expense of the consequences of this decision, which is the inequality of individuals in a different realm.
Also, liberty and equality can find places in that they butt heads. Sen points to Nozick as being an ethical theorist who is routinely identified as being anti-egalitarian. This is because he is so heavily focused on the promotion of ideals of liberty. Sen believes that this logic is, “…altogether faulty” (22). It is not that liberty and equality stand in juxtaposition with one another, but rather that liberty is one of the goods that can be equally distributed, like income or justice.
This brings into question the very nature of the use of equality in the determination of ethical standards. “If equality can possibly speak with so many voices, can we take any of its demands seriously?” (23). The answer is yes. Sen goes on to claim that, “…the need to value equality in some space that is seen to be particularly important is not an empty demand” (24). He also claims that, “…equality can be a particularly powerful and exacting demand” (24). Finally, he explains that equality in so many different realms doesn’t at all lessen the powerful effect of equality, but rather is indicative of the difficulty of individuals to come together to agree on what should be valued.
In fact, the plurality of these different focuses can actually help to construct an ethical argument. Sen explores Rawl’s theory of fairness and finds that there is a plurality of foci: there is a focus on primary good equality on one side and freedom or well-being on the other provides for an interesting approach to ethical reasoning. “The plurality of focal variables can make a great difference precisely because of the diversity of human beings” (28).
Sen ends the chapter by evaluating a standard measure of equality: income. He finds it to be wholly lacking. Income equality is a rough measure that goes a long way to obscuring other important metrics of inequality and equality because it is so analytically elegant and relatively easy to apply. Because these approaches are so widely used and easily deployed, they go a long way to obscuring other ways of measuring equality. Other important measures of inequality, like freedom and well-being, can be affected in many different ways by different levels of income; the two variables do not move together in lock-step.
Monday, April 21, 2008
Nussbaum: Human Capabilities, Femal Human Beings
Nussbaum, Martha Craven, Jonathan Glover and World Institute for Development Economics Research. (1995). Women, culture, and development : a study of human capabilities. Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0605/94042602-d.html
Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings
“Women have rarely been kings, or nobles, or couriers, or rich. They have, on the other hand, frequently been poor and sick and dead” (62).
“My proposal is frankly universalist and ‘essentialist’. That is, it asks us to focus on what is common to all, rather than on differences…and to see some capabilities and functions as more central, more at the core of human life, than others” (63).
This account begins by telling stories that emerge from academic conferences. These stories involve interactions between “relativists” and “universalists”. The universalists present papers and the relativists take issue with their essentialist claims. The relativists do not want the universalists to fall into traps that do not respect basic levels of diversity and difference. The universalists want the relativists to understand that there are some underlying aspects of life that are not uniquely subjective, for example, the difference between life and death.
“For we see here highly-intelligent people, people deeply committed to the good of women and men in developing countries, people who think of themselves as progressive and feminist and anti-racist, people who correctly argue that the concept of development is an evaluative concept requiring normative argument—effectively eschewing normative argument and taking up positions that converge…with the positions of reaction, oppression, and sexism” (66).
“Many critics of universalism in ethics are really critics of metaphysical realism who assume that realism is a necessary basis for universalism. I shall argue that this assumption is false” (67-8).
“…the attack on realism has been sufficiently deep and sufficiently sustained that it would appear strategically wise for an ethical and political view that seeks broad support not to rely on the truth of metaphysical realism, if it can defend itself in some other ways” (69).
Nussbaum firstly tries to situate an argument about universality within a pragmatic framework. She understands that the relativist position does have something important to add to the broader discussion regarding the rights of women. She claims that she must be able to take her universalistic argument and defend it using different strategies than would normally be deployed. She tones down the universalist rhetoric and makes the case regarding subjective interpretation of sensory facts: the relativists believe that observations are tinged with subjectivity, and that this is what constructs narratives and discourses, etc. Nussbaum takes that position that she agrees, but she also argues that, while this may or may not be true, the history of development and academia has been a history of universals.
She also highlights some anecdotal accounts of universality among human beings, from Aristotle to a person with a broadly trans-national extended family.
She moves on to claim that she must examine her account with an eye towards more standard criticisms of universalism. She begins by looking at the, “neglect of historical and cultural differences” critique.
“The opposition charges that any attempt to pick out some elements of human life as more fundamental than others, even without appeal to a transhistorical reality, is bound to be insufficiently respectful of actual historical and cultural differences” (70). “It is far from clear what this objection shows” (71).
“Neglect of Autonomy”: This critique of universalism argues that the subject of development is not given the right to determine what they themselves want.
“Prejudicial Application”: “If we operate with a determinate conception of the human being that is meant to have some normative moral and political force, we must also, in applying it, ask which beings we shall take to fall under the concept” (71). The example of Aristotle is given: he didn’t believe that women or slaves were fully human.
However, Nussbaum argues that it is unclear whether or not we would be better off or worse off without these universal concepts: “For it could be plausibly argued that it would have been even easier to exclude women and slaves on a whim if one did not have such a concept to contend with” (72).
Nussbaum goes on to identify the central capabilities that make someone a human being.
She then lists 8 methodological points: the procedure is not ahistorical or a priori; it attempts to look across boundaries for similarities; the account is not biologtical or metaphysical; the account is open-ended; the account accepts that some accounts are constructed differently in different societies; this consensus must be reached by reasonable procedures; the list is heterogeneous; and the concept human being is normative and ethical.
Here is the account of human life:
Morality: we all die.
The Human Body: we all have one
Hunger and Thirst:
Shelter:
Sexual Desire:
Mobility:
Pain and Pleasure:
Cognitive Capacity:
Infant Development:
Practical Reason:
Affiliation with other Human Beings:
Related ness to other Species and Nature:
Humor and Play:
Separateness:
Strong Separateness:
“This is a working list. It is put out to generate debate. It has done so and will continue to do so, and it will be revised accordingly” (80). This list is composed of both capabilities and limits.
Nussbaum now attempts to identify two distinct thresholds: “…a threshold of capability to function beneath which all life will be so impoverished that it will not be human at all; and a somewhat higher threshold, beneath which those characteristic functions are available in such a reduced way that, although we may judge the form of life a human one, we will not think it a good human life. The latter threshold is the on that will eventually concern us when we turn to public policy: for we don’t want societies to make their citizens capable of the bare minimum” (81).
Nussbaum then argues that it should be capabilities and functioning that determine human well being. She lists these in section 4.1, and they are derivatives of her earlier account of what makes a human life. She then examines how well countries have been meeting the needs of their populations. She claims that there is a clear need for a conception of a human being in policy realms.
Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings
“Women have rarely been kings, or nobles, or couriers, or rich. They have, on the other hand, frequently been poor and sick and dead” (62).
“My proposal is frankly universalist and ‘essentialist’. That is, it asks us to focus on what is common to all, rather than on differences…and to see some capabilities and functions as more central, more at the core of human life, than others” (63).
This account begins by telling stories that emerge from academic conferences. These stories involve interactions between “relativists” and “universalists”. The universalists present papers and the relativists take issue with their essentialist claims. The relativists do not want the universalists to fall into traps that do not respect basic levels of diversity and difference. The universalists want the relativists to understand that there are some underlying aspects of life that are not uniquely subjective, for example, the difference between life and death.
“For we see here highly-intelligent people, people deeply committed to the good of women and men in developing countries, people who think of themselves as progressive and feminist and anti-racist, people who correctly argue that the concept of development is an evaluative concept requiring normative argument—effectively eschewing normative argument and taking up positions that converge…with the positions of reaction, oppression, and sexism” (66).
“Many critics of universalism in ethics are really critics of metaphysical realism who assume that realism is a necessary basis for universalism. I shall argue that this assumption is false” (67-8).
“…the attack on realism has been sufficiently deep and sufficiently sustained that it would appear strategically wise for an ethical and political view that seeks broad support not to rely on the truth of metaphysical realism, if it can defend itself in some other ways” (69).
Nussbaum firstly tries to situate an argument about universality within a pragmatic framework. She understands that the relativist position does have something important to add to the broader discussion regarding the rights of women. She claims that she must be able to take her universalistic argument and defend it using different strategies than would normally be deployed. She tones down the universalist rhetoric and makes the case regarding subjective interpretation of sensory facts: the relativists believe that observations are tinged with subjectivity, and that this is what constructs narratives and discourses, etc. Nussbaum takes that position that she agrees, but she also argues that, while this may or may not be true, the history of development and academia has been a history of universals.
She also highlights some anecdotal accounts of universality among human beings, from Aristotle to a person with a broadly trans-national extended family.
She moves on to claim that she must examine her account with an eye towards more standard criticisms of universalism. She begins by looking at the, “neglect of historical and cultural differences” critique.
“The opposition charges that any attempt to pick out some elements of human life as more fundamental than others, even without appeal to a transhistorical reality, is bound to be insufficiently respectful of actual historical and cultural differences” (70). “It is far from clear what this objection shows” (71).
“Neglect of Autonomy”: This critique of universalism argues that the subject of development is not given the right to determine what they themselves want.
“Prejudicial Application”: “If we operate with a determinate conception of the human being that is meant to have some normative moral and political force, we must also, in applying it, ask which beings we shall take to fall under the concept” (71). The example of Aristotle is given: he didn’t believe that women or slaves were fully human.
However, Nussbaum argues that it is unclear whether or not we would be better off or worse off without these universal concepts: “For it could be plausibly argued that it would have been even easier to exclude women and slaves on a whim if one did not have such a concept to contend with” (72).
Nussbaum goes on to identify the central capabilities that make someone a human being.
She then lists 8 methodological points: the procedure is not ahistorical or a priori; it attempts to look across boundaries for similarities; the account is not biologtical or metaphysical; the account is open-ended; the account accepts that some accounts are constructed differently in different societies; this consensus must be reached by reasonable procedures; the list is heterogeneous; and the concept human being is normative and ethical.
Here is the account of human life:
Morality: we all die.
The Human Body: we all have one
Hunger and Thirst:
Shelter:
Sexual Desire:
Mobility:
Pain and Pleasure:
Cognitive Capacity:
Infant Development:
Practical Reason:
Affiliation with other Human Beings:
Related ness to other Species and Nature:
Humor and Play:
Separateness:
Strong Separateness:
“This is a working list. It is put out to generate debate. It has done so and will continue to do so, and it will be revised accordingly” (80). This list is composed of both capabilities and limits.
Nussbaum now attempts to identify two distinct thresholds: “…a threshold of capability to function beneath which all life will be so impoverished that it will not be human at all; and a somewhat higher threshold, beneath which those characteristic functions are available in such a reduced way that, although we may judge the form of life a human one, we will not think it a good human life. The latter threshold is the on that will eventually concern us when we turn to public policy: for we don’t want societies to make their citizens capable of the bare minimum” (81).
Nussbaum then argues that it should be capabilities and functioning that determine human well being. She lists these in section 4.1, and they are derivatives of her earlier account of what makes a human life. She then examines how well countries have been meeting the needs of their populations. She claims that there is a clear need for a conception of a human being in policy realms.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
